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This dissertation addresses the issues of capital controls and informal economy. Both 
subjects have evoked considerable interest in both academic environments and policy 
circles, especially given their importance for developing countries. The dissertation is 
structured as follows. Chapter 1 analyzes how exchange rate regimes influence fiscal 
discipline. This important question has typically been addressed using models 
assuming perfect capital mobility, even though capital controls are pervasive in 
developing countries. This chapter analyzes the effects of capital controls on fiscal 
performance by focusing on dual exchange rate regimes. In a model in which fiscal 
policy is endogenously determined by a non-benevolent fiscal authority, the paper 
shows that capital controls induce impatient politicians to have looser fiscal policies 
than under fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. While 
capital controls enable politicians to enjoy the same temporarily low inflation as fixed 
regimes (since the commercial exchange rate is assumed to be fixed) lax fiscal 
policies also result in a temporary consumption boom which is regarded as desirable 
  
by impatient politicians. The consumption boom occurs because, as households 
attempt to get rid of unwanted real money balances, the real domestic interest rate 
falls. Empirical analysis confirms that capital controls lead to larger primary deficits 
than fixed and flexible regimes. The study considers a dynamic panel data 
specification and controls for endogeneity by using a standard instrumental variables 
approach and natural disaster events to evaluate the response of fiscal policies under 
diverse regimes. Chapter 2 estimates the size of the informal economy for the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) countries and 26 mainly Latin American 
countries in the early 2000s, being the first study to address this issue for the ECCU 
economies and many other Central American and Caribbean countries. Using a 
structural equation modeling approach we find that a stringent tax system and 
regulatory environment, higher inflation and dominance of the agriculture sector are 
key factors in determining the size of the informal economy. The results also confirm 
that a higher degree of informality reduces labor unionization, the number of 
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Exchange Rate Regimes and Fiscal Discipline:
The Role of Capital Controls
1.1 Introduction
The influence of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline has long been debated
in both academic environments and policy makers’ circles, especially given the
importance of this relationship for emerging and developing countries. There
is a vast theoretical literature addressing this issue and an inconclusive and
relatively scarce empirical literature.
The theoretical literature discusses the influence of exchange rate regimes
on fiscal discipline exploiting the classic dichotomy of “fixed vs. flexible”.
Conventional wisdom –represented by papers like Aghevli et al. (1991),
Frenkel et al. (1991) and Giavazzi and Pagano (1988)– emphasizes the strong
disciplinary properties of fixed regimes by stressing the deterrent effect that the
fear of fixed exchange rate collapse has over fiscal authorities. However, a more
recent and widely cited paper by Tornell and Velasco (1998) takes issue with
the previous perspective by considering political economy arguments. Tornell
and Velasco find that lax fiscal policies have political costs in terms of inflation
under both regimes. The difference is the intertemporal distribution of these
costs: under flexible regimes they manifest immediately through the exchange
rate, while under fixed regimes, they become evident only when the exhaustion
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of reserves makes the fixed regime collapse. If the fiscal authority is impatient,
flexible regimes provide more fiscal discipline by forcing the cost to be paid
up-front.
Both conventional wisdom and Tornell and Velasco assume perfect capital
mobility, even though capital controls are pervasive in emerging and developing
countries. Capital controls, in their diverse forms, have been a common
phenomenon in many emerging and developing countries during the 70s and
80s. While less dominant in the 90s and early 2000s, unrestricted capital flows
seem to be the exception rather than the rule. Some recent examples of capital
controls include Malaysia in 1998, Argentina in 2002 and Venezuela in 2003.
One specific type of capital control commonly implemented in emerging and
developing countries is the dual regime. A dual regime is an exchange rate
arrangement in which a market-determined exchange rate, typically applying
to financial transactions (financial exchange rate), coexists with one or more
fixed exchange rate(s) for current account transactions (commercial exchange
rate). In other words, a dual regime is equivalent to a fixed regime with capital
controls. Using the Reinhart-Rogoff (2002) exchange rate regime classification
for 23 emerging markets, we find that more than 60 percent of this sample had
dual regimes during the 70s and 80s and about 20 percent still had them in the
90s and early 2000s.
In this paper we analyze both theoretically and empirically the influence
of capital controls on fiscal discipline. We develop a standard optimization
2
model with price flexibility, and a political economy framework and structure
similar to that employed by Tornell and Velasco, but allowing for capital controls
modeled as dual regimes.1 The economy is inhabited by a representative private
agent blessed with perfect foresight and a government composed of a fiscal
authority and a central bank. The model does not analyze the choice of
exchange rate regimes; it only compares fiscal performance under alternative
monetary and capital flows policies. The central bank can precommit to follow
a particular exchange rate regime only for a finite period of time; after that,
regimes are abandoned and the central bank must adjust inflation to ensure that
the government’s budget constraint is satisfied, similar to Sargent and Wallace
(1981) and Drazen (1985). This setup captures the idea that stabilization plans
are subject to “temporariness” or “imperfect credibility” as described in Calvo
(1986, 1991) and Drazen and Helpman (1987). The private agent chooses how
much to consume and how much money to hold. The fiscal authority decides
the level of net fiscal transfers that the public receives in a lump sum manner.
The fiscal authority has the proclivity to spend more than socially desirable,
possibly because such spending provides political power, prestige and/or greater
chances of reelection. The politician in charge of the budget also internalizes the
private agent’s objective function, but might discount the future at a different
rate. We show that capital controls induce looser fiscal policies than fixed and
flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility in the periods before
the stabilization plan reaches its end. The theoretical argument is quite simple:
1 Hereafter the terms “dual regimes” and “capital controls” will be used interchangeably.
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- Under fixed regimes, weak fiscal policies lead to a fall in reserves or an
increase in debt. Only when the situation gets unsustainable, the exchange rate
collapses and the inflation cost becomes tangible. Policymakers can enjoy lax
fiscal policies and low inflation today, at the cost of high inflation in the future.
- Under flexible regimes, lax fiscal behavior augments future expected
monetization, creating an increase in current prices as in Sargent and Wallace
(1981) and Drazen (1985). This occurs because the desire to reduce money
holdings in the future creates pressures on the exchange rate market today,
which in the absence of central bank intervention effectively increases the current
exchange rate and the price level. Any fiscal misconduct is paid for with current
and future inflation.
- Under capital controls, unsound fiscal policies also increase future an-
ticipated monetization and, consequently, reduce the desired future money
holdings. The latter change creates excess demand for bonds which, due
to the presence of capital controls, increases the financial exchange rate and
reduces the current domestic real interest rate. This last factor increases today’s
consumption, augmenting the current account deficit. That is to say, capital
controls enable the same temporarily low inflation as fixed regimes, since the
commercial exchange rate is assumed to be fixed, but they also boost current
consumption as private agents attempt to reduce their real balances because
of the expected inflation tax. Politicians can enjoy the benefits of a lax fiscal
stance, low inflation and a consumption party today, at the cost of high inflation
4
and a consumption hangover in the future.
The basic point of Tornell and Velasco’s paper is that if inflation is costly for
the fiscal authorities, flexible regimes provide tighter fiscal discipline than fixed
regimes by forcing the costs to be paid up-front. We argue that capital controls
induce even looser fiscal policies than fixed regimes while the stabilization plan
lasts. This occurs because capital controls enable free-spending politicians to
enjoy the same temporarily low inflation as fixed regimes, as well as a temporary
consumption boom which is regarded as desirable by impatient politicians.
This temporary consumption boom induce politicians to engage in looser fiscal
policies before the stabilization plan collapses. Therefore, while the anticipated
reaction of the exchange rate market moderates fiscal behavior under flexible
rates, under capital controls it encourages loose fiscal policies.
Using a sample of 23 emerging markets for the period 1970-2001 and the
de facto Reinhart-Rogoff classification, we confirm that capital controls lead to
larger primary deficits than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified
rates. Our findings also support Tornell and Velasco’s core prediction that
fixed regimes induce less discipline than flexible arrangements. Consistent with
our model, we test the main theoretical implications considering only relatively
“tranquil” times. For this reason, we exclude observations associated with the
Reinhart-Rogoff exchange rate regime category “free falling”, which includes
episodes with an annual inflation higher than 40 percent. We obtain such results
considering a dynamic panel data specification, and we address previous studies’
5
limitations related to the potential endogeneity of the exchange rate regime. We
distinguish three main potential sources of endogeneity and propose different
ways to control for them:
- Regime classification endogeneity. Since the Reinhart-Rogoff classifica-
tion categorizes regimes based upon the evolution of the market-determined
exchange rate, it is likely that countries experiencing poor fiscal performance
would tend to have more flexible regimes ex post, while countries experiencing
sound fiscal policies would increase their chance of sustaining fixed regimes
or capital controls. Therefore, this source of endogeneity tends to generate
the appearance of tighter fiscal performance in fixed and dual regimes than in
flexible arrangements. Since the empirical results do not show this pattern,
accounting for this source of endogeneity would strengthen our results.
- Endogeneity due to regime choice under stress. Countries experiencing
persistent fiscal deficits or other financial and debt difficulties could adopt fixed
regimes as a stabilizing device, or impose capital controls to avoid the effects of
a depreciation on domestic prices while maintaining some degree of control over
capital outflows and international reserves. Therefore, this source of endogeneity
tends to generate the appearance of looser fiscal performance in fixed and dual
regimes than in flexible arrangements. In order to reduce the likelihood of this
type of endogeneity we use only observations that are at least two years distant
from “free falling” events, and we control for regressors that are symptoms of
macroeconomic and financial distress, such as episodes of debt default, bank
6
crisis and the presence of IMF programs.
- Endogeneity due to government type. As in Tornell and Velasco, we assume
in our model that the central bank’s monetary and capital flows policies are
exogenous and are not the result of any optimization problem. However, it seems
reasonable to think that, to the extent that the regime’s choice affects fiscal
discipline, the fiscal authority will try to influence the central bank to choose
the type of exchange rate regime that suits the policymaker better. Therefore,
in line with the theoretical predictions, free-spending politicians would be more
likely than conservative politicians to attempt to persuade the central bank to
choose fixed regimes or impose capital controls. For this reason, this source of
endogeneity tends to generate the appearance of looser fiscal performance in
fixed and dual regimes than in flexible arrangements. We control for this source
of endogeneity by using instrumental variables for the exchange rate regime and
by exploiting the randomness of natural disaster events to evaluate the response
of fiscal policies under diverse exchange rate regimes.
This paper is at the crossroads of two main strands of the literature: the
literature on capital controls and the literature on the influence of exchange
rate regimes on fiscal discipline. Existing models of capital controls focus on
the implications of capital controls for a myriad of variables, but treat fiscal
activity as exogenously given (see for example, Calvo (1981, 1989), Obstfeld
(1984), Guidotti and Végh (1992)). In contrast, the model proposed in this
paper endogenously determines fiscal policy by including an optimizing fiscal
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authority. Previous studies that analyze the influence of exchange rate regimes
on fiscal behavior use models with endogenous fiscal determination, but assume
perfect capital mobility (see for example Tornell and Velasco (1998) and Sun
(2003)). Instead, we analyze the fiscal incentives under capital controls.
This paper is also related to the literature that documents and analyzes
the consumption party and subsequent hangover observed under temporary
stabilization programs (see Calvo (1986), Kiguel and Liviatan (1992), Végh
(1991), Calvo and Végh (1993) and Reinhart and Végh (1995)).
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the
model, in section 3 we show the empirical results and in Section 4 we make some
final remarks.
1.2 The Model
In this section we develop a theoretical model with a political economy
framework and structure similar to that employed by Tornell and Velasco,
but allowing for capital controls modeled as dual exchange rate regimes. For
comparison purposes, we also reproduce Tornell and Velasco’s results under
fixed and flexible regimes operating under perfect capital mobility. The rest of
this section is organized as follows. First, we describe the main features of the
model, including the agents involved and their sequence of actions and budget
constraints. We also explain the behavior of the real interest rate under capital
controls by examining the uncovered interest parity condition. Secondly, we
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solve the model and show the intuition and some numerical examples confirming
that capital controls induce looser discipline than fixed and flexible regimes
during the periods before the stabilization plan reaches its end.
1.2.1 Set up
The economy is inhabited by a government, consisting of a fiscal authority
(FA) and a central bank (CB), and a representative private agent (PA) blessed
with perfect foresight. We consider a small endowment economy that lasts
three periods -periods 0, 1 and 2- with either perfect capital mobility or capital
controls modeled as a dual exchange rate. For simplicity we also assume that
the world real interest rate r remains constant.
There is one tradable good which is used as the numeraire. Assuming that
the law of one price holds and normalizing the foreign price level at one, we
obtain that the nominal exchange rate (the commercial rate under dual regimes)
is equal to the domestic price level, i.e. Et = Pt.









The financial exchange rate operating under capital controls is denoted as
Qt. For notational purposes, variables in capital letters are expressed in terms
2 Throughout this paper, the exchange rate is defined as units of domestic currency per
unit of foreign currency.
3 We specify the inflation and devaluation rates so that they are constraint between 0 and
1.
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of the domestic currency (i.e. nominal terms), while small letters are used for
variables expressed in terms of the numeraire (i.e. real terms). There exist two
assets: domestic currency, denoted by Mt, and internationally traded bonds
held by both the PA , ft, and the government, bt. We also assume that assets
are chosen at the end of period t and carried over into period t+1.
1.2.1.1 Sequence of Actions
In period 0 the CB announces its monetary and capital flows policies and,
subsequently, the FA announces the net fiscal transfers that will occur in
the future, τ1 and τ2.
4 Right after this news, the PA attempts to rearrange
her portfolio from (m0−, f0−) to (m0, f0).
5 While she can achieve such
rearrangement under perfect capital mobility, she cannot alter her portfolio
composition under capital controls (i.e. m0 = m0− and f0 = f0−) because under
capital controls the commercial exchange rate cannot jump (i.e. E0 = E0−), the
private capital account is closed and the CB does not intervene in the financial
market. Lastly, the government transfers to the PA the gain (loss) it made as
a result of movement in the exchange rate during period 0.
During period 1 the PA selects c1 and m1, her desired real balances for period
2. The FA does not make any decision in periods 1 or 2.6
When period 2 arrives, the government repays its outstanding debt, the
4 These net transfers equal expenditures minus revenues. Hence, they could be either
negative or positive.
5 m0− and f0− refer to the initial asset conditions.
6 We assume that the FA can commit to the announcements made in period 0 to avoid well
known inconsistency issues, which are not the main argument of the paper. See Sun (2003)
for a treatment of this subject.
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CB redeems the value of outstanding real balances, and the PA uses all her
accumulated wealth and income to consume c2 and pay the inflation tax.
1.2.1.2 The Central Bank’s Alternative Monetary and
Capital Flows Policies
As in Tornell and Velasco, we assume that the CB’s monetary and capital
flows policies are exogenous, and are not the result of any optimization problem.7
We assume that the CB can precommit to an independent monetary policy
that ignores the behavior of the FA only for a finite period of time, periods 0
and 1 in our model:8
- Under fixed regimes, the CB sets the nominal devaluation rates of period 0
and period 1 equal to zero (i.e. π0 = π1 = 0), and the nominal money supplies
M0 and M1 become endogenous.
9
- In a flexible regime the CB sets the growth rate of nominal money in
period 0 and period 1 equal to zero (i.e. µ0 ≡ (M0 −M0−)/M0 = 0 and µ1 ≡
(M1 −M0)/M1 = 0), and the exchange rates E0 and E1 become endogenous.10
- Under capital controls the CB sets the nominal devaluation rate of the
commercial exchange rate for period 0 and period 1 equal to zero (i.e. π0 = π1 =
7 One interesting extension of the paper would be to include such an optimization process
and to see how it affects the choice of the exchange rate regime.
8 The assumption of finite precommitment to an independent monetary policy is not based
on the idea that CBs are independent of government’s influence. It aims to capture the idea
that stabilization plans are subject to “temporariness” or “imperfect credibility” problems as
described in Calvo (1986, 1991) and Drazen and Helpman (1987).
9 Similar qualitative results hold if devaluation rates differ from zero. See Tornell and
Velasco for details.
10 Similar qualitative results hold if the growth rate of nominal money differs from zero.
See Tornell and Velasco for details.
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0), and the PA is prohibited from freely transacting in the world capital markets.
The CB does not intervene in the financial market; however, it sells (buys)
foreign bonds for (with) money for current account purposes. As previously
discussed, this implies that the PA cannot change her portfolio in period 0
(i.e. M0− = M0, m0− = m0 and f0 = f0−). The financial exchange rate, real
domestic interest rates and M1 become endogenous.
In period 2, as in Sargent and Wallace (1981) and Drazen (1985), inflation
must adjust to ensure that the government’s budget constraint is satisfied. We
also assume that capital controls are abandoned (i.e. Q2 = E2). Therefore, it
makes no difference what the exchange rate regime is in period 2.
In other words, period 0 and 1 can be thought of as the interval of time in
which the stabilization plan is sustained, and period 2 as the time in which the
bomb explodes and the stabilization plan reaches its end. For this reason, and
since all regimes explode in period 2, we effectively observe the performance of
each regime as such only under relatively “tranquil” conditions, in periods 0
and 1. This issue is very important not only from a theoretical point of view
but also from an empirical perspective as we will remark later.
1.2.1.3 Uncovered Interest Parity Condition
One crucial implication of abandoning the perfect capital mobility assump-
tion is that the real domestic interest rate ρt does not necessarily coincide with
the world real interest rate r. Specifically, under perfect foresight and capital
12
controls, the uncovered interest parity condition and the Fisher equation lead
to the following well-known condition for the real domestic interest rate:
1 + ρt =
qt+1
qt
(1 + r), (2)
where qt ≡ Qt/Et.11 Thus, the return on bonds in the domestic economy also
includes capital gains associated with the depreciation of the financial exchange
rate relative to the commercial one.




(1 + r)− 1. (3)
Therefore, ρ1 = r when Q1 = E1 and ρ1 < r (ρ1 > r) when Q1 > E1 (Q1 < E1).
In other words, a positive (negative) exchange rate premium is associated with
a real domestic interest rate lower (higher) than r. As will become clear later,
this is the key element driving our results under imperfect capital mobility.
1.2.1.4 The Private Agent’s Budget Constraints and
Objective Function
We assume that the PA receives an exogenous endowment income y of
tradable goods in periods 1 and 2, and that she has an initial stock of
internationally traded bonds f0− and a stock of money M0−. Then the PA’s
11 We assume that interest income is repatriated at the financial exchange rate. The
expression for the real domestic interest rate would be slightly different if the commercial rate
was used.
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budget constraint for period 0 under perfect capital mobility is12
f0 − f0− = m0− −m0, (4)






= m0− −m0. (5)
The PA’s budget constraint for period 1 under perfect capital mobility is
(1 + r)f0 + m0 + y + τ1 = c1 + π1m0 + m1 + f1, (6)
12 As discussed in Tornell and Velasco in the context of perfect capital mobility, and more
generally as considered in Auernheimer (1974), in order to make a consistent comparison
across exchange rate regimes, it is necessary to offset the government’s extra revenue capacity
that occurs in period 0 as a result of any unanticipated jump in the exchange rate. This
circumstance only arises under flexible regimes.
Under fixed regimes, the PA buys (sells) domestic currency from (to) the CB changing her
nominal stock of domestic currency from M0− to M0. Since the nominal exchange rate E0
cannot move under fixed regimes (i.e. E0 = E0−), the portfolio rearrangement is obtained
through the following operation at the CB: (M0−M0−)/E0 = m0−m0− = b0−b0−. After the
PA rearranges her portfolio, the government net assets are b0−m0 = b0−−m0−. Consequently,
there is no transfer of wealth between the PA and the government in period 0 as a result of
the announcements.
Under flexible regimes the CB does not intervene in the foreign exchange market (i.e.
M0− = M0). Therefore, the market only clears as a result of an exchange rate movement in
period 0. Since m0 = (1−π0)m0−, with π0 ≡ (E0−E0−)/E0, the PA experiences a capital loss
(gain) of π0m0− that implies an equivalent gain (loss) for the government. Following Tornell
and Velasco we assume that at the end of period 0 the government gives a rebate to the PA
equal to s0 = π0m0−. Since m0 is all the real domestic balances the PA wishes to hold, she
uses the government transfer to buy bonds, hence f0 = f0−+s0. After these operations occur
in period 0, the government net assets are b0 −m0 = b0− −m0− + π0m0− − s0 = b0− −m0−,
the same as under fixed regimes.
13 Under capital controls the CB does not intervene in the financial exchange market and
the commercial exchange rate cannot jump (i.e. M0− = M0 and E0− = E0). For this reason
the exchange rate market only clears as a result of a movement in the financial exchange rate
in period 0. Since (Q0/E0)(f0−f0−) = m0−−m0, the PA experiences a capital loss (gain) of
(1−E0/Q0)(m0− −m0) that implies an equivalent gain (loss) for the government. However,
for the reasons explained in Section 1.2.1, m0− = m0 and f0 = f0− and, consequently, there
are no effective transfers between the government and the PA. For this reason, the government
net assets at the very end of period 0 are b0 −m0 = b0− −m0−, the same as under fixed and
flexible regimes.
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while under capital controls it is
Q1
E1




For period 2, the budget constraint is the same under both perfect capital
mobility and capital control because we assume Q2 = E2:
(1 + r)(f1 + m1) + y + τ2 = c2 + (r + π2)m1. (8)
Combining equations (4), (6) and (8) we obtain the PA’s intertemporal
budget constraint under perfect capital mobility:









c1 + (r + π1)m0 +
c2 + (r + π2)m1
1 + r
, (9)
which has the usual interpretation that the present value of expenditures
must equal the present value of income.
Combining equations (5), (7) and (8) we obtain the intertemporal budget
constraint under capital controls:
(1 + r)2
1 + ρ1
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where ε ∈ (0, 1) to guarantee that the economy is always on the upward-sloping
side of the Laffer curve.14 Note that the objective function involves m0 and m1
instead of m1 and m2, because the former notation refers to real money balances
prevailing in periods 1 and 2 respectively.
1.2.1.5 The Government’s Budget Constraints and
Objective Function
We present the consolidated accounts of both the FA and CB. The
government has an initial total stock of net foreign assets b0− and monetary
liabilities M0−. In period 1, the FA transfers a net amount τ1 to the PA, financed
with interest income rb0, monetary revenue (M1−M0)/E1 = (m1−m0)+π1m0
(which includes both seigniorage and the inflation tax) and by changing its
total net asset position. Under capital controls the FA also receives revenues if
there is a positive (negative) exchange rate premium and private capital inflows
(outflows).15 In period 2, the government makes a transfer τ2 and pays back its
real debt and money balances, using only the inflation tax. The government’s
budget constraint for period 0 under perfect capital mobility is
14 This assumption guarantees that inflation tax revenue is increasing in inflation.
15 Similar qualitative results would be obtained if a separate institution that deals with the
purchase and sale of internationally traded bonds rebated all revenues to the PA at the end
of the respective period, as long as this behavior is not internalized by the PA.
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b0− − b0 = m0− −m0, (12)






= m0− −m0. (13)
The government’s budget constraint for period 1 under perfect capital
mobility is
b1 + τ1 = (1 + r)b0 + m1 −m0 + π1m0, (14)
while under capital controls it is






f1 − f0(1 + r)
)
. (15)
Given the assumption Q2 = E2 the budget constraint for period 2 is the
same under perfect capital mobility and capital controls:
m1 + τ2 = (1 + r)b1 + π2m1. (16)
Combining equations (12), (14) and (16) the government’s intertemporal








which has the usual interpretation that the present value of expenditures must
equal the present value of revenues.
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Combining equations (13), (15) and (16) the government’s intertemporal
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where υ′(τ) > 0, υ′′(τ) < 0, β is the FA’s subjective discount factor, β ∈ (0, 1),
and α ∈ (0, 1). It is worth making two points about this function. First,
government transfers give utility, possibly because they provide political power,
prestige and/or greater chances of reelection. This factor carries a weight of α in
the FA’s objective function. Second, the FA also internalizes the PA’s objective
function with a weight (1−α), but the FA’s discount factor β does not necessarily
match that of the PA, which equals 1/(1 + r). Hence, an impatient FA with
direct incentives to engage in fiscal transfers (i.e. α > 0 and β < 1/(1 + r))
would not only be delighted to have a fiscal party but would also like the PA to
have a consumption party.16
16 The term fiscal party (consumption party) refers to an intertemporal profile in which the
level of fiscal transfers (consumption) in period 1 is bigger than in period 2.
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Combining equations (9) and (17) or (10) and (18) we obtain the economy’s
resource constraint under perfect capital mobility and capital controls:









Given that the government consumes nothing, the present value of consumption
simply equals the present value of national income, including the initial net
foreign assets of the economy.
1.2.2 Solution to the Private Agent’s Problem
Now we solve the PA’s problem under perfect capital mobility and capital
controls.
1.2.2.1 Solution to the PA’s Problem:
The Perfect Capital Mobility Case
The PA optimizes with respect to c1, c2, m0 and m1 to maximize (11) subject
to (9), taking as given τ1, τ2, π1 and π2. The optimal conditions under perfect












ε (r + π2)
−ε. (23)
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Condition (21) implies that consumption is constant across both periods.
Combining this last equality with (20), consumption equals permanent income






(b0− + f0−) + y. (24)
1.2.2.2 Solution to the PA’s Problem:
The Capital Controls Case
The PA optimizes with respect to c1, c2, m0 and m1 to maximize (11) subject
to (10), taking as given τ1, τ2, π1, π2, ρ0 and ρ1. The optimal conditions under















ε (ρ1 + π2)
−ε. (27)
Condition (25) indicates that consumption might not be the same in both
periods. Specifically, the ratio (c∗1,cc/c
∗
2,cc) equals one if ρ1 = r, and is a
decreasing function of ρ1; consumption is higher when it is cheaper.
Substituting equation (25) into (20) and considering (24), we have that
c∗1,cc = c̄
[
(2 + r)(1 + r)





(2 + r)(1 + ρ1)




To understand further the intertemporal distortion of consumption under
capital controls we define
Distortion(c1) =
∣∣∣ c∗1,cc − c̄ ∣∣∣, (30)
Distortion(c2) =
∣∣∣ c∗2,cc − c̄ ∣∣∣. (31)
Combining (28), (29), (30) and (31) we find that Distortion(c1)(1 + r) =
Distortion(c2), so that Distortion(c1) < Distortion(c2) whenever ρ1 6= r. That
is to say, the impact of any difference between ρ1 and r on consumption is more
pronounced for c∗2,cc than for c
∗
1,cc. For example, if ρ1 < r, then c
∗
1,cc is higher
than the permanent income c̄ while c∗2,cc is lower than c̄ by an even greater
margin. In other words, when ρ1 < r, the PA experiences a consumption party
in period 1 and a severe hangover in period 2.
1.2.3 Endogenous Determination of Fiscal Policy
Now we focus on the FA’s optimization problem under alternative exchange rate
regimes by solving the Ramsey planner’s problem. The FA chooses quantities,
as a planner would, but subject to the constraint that the chosen allocation be
implementable as a competitive equilibrium. As remarked earlier, the solutions
for fixed and flexible regimes correspond to Tornell and Velasco and are only
developed for comparison purposes.
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1.2.3.1 Endogenous Determination of Fiscal Policy:
Fixed Regime Case
The benefit of increasing fiscal transfers derives from the direct increase in
the FA’s utility, while the cost originates from the lower real balances held by
the PA in period 2. The FA effectively chooses τ1, τ2, and m1 to maximize
(19) subject to (17), (9), (21), (24), π1 = 0 and π2 = c̄m
−1/ε
1 − r from (23).
Combining the optimal conditions we obtain
υ′(τ ∗1,fixed) = (1 + r)βυ
′(τ ∗2,fixed), (32)






















Equation (32) states that the intertemporal pattern of transfers depends
only on the discount and interest rates. Equations (33) and (34) also indicate
that there is a positive relationship between consumption and fiscal transfers.
This occurs because of the positive association between the marginal utility
of FA’s transfers and the marginal utility of PA’s consumption. In other
words, aside from the terms involving r, β, α and ε, the FA increases
(decreases) fiscal transfers as consumption increases (decreases). However,
because there is consumption smoothing under perfect capital mobility, this
factor does not play an active role in the intertemporal pattern of fiscal









1.2.3.2 Endogenous Determination of Fiscal Policy:
Flexible Regime Case
The benefit of increasing fiscal transfers derives from the direct increment
in the FA’s utility, while the costs originate from the lower real balances held
by the PA in periods 1 and 2. Hence, unlike the fixed regime case, inflation is
endogenously determined in period 1 and responds to events that are anticipated
to take place in period 2. This forces the FA to consider the effect that fiscal
transfers have, not only on money demand in period 2, but also in period 1. The
FA selects τ1, τ2, m0 and m1 to maximize (19) subject to (17), (9), (21), (24),
π1 = c̄m
−1/ε
0 − r from (22), π2 = c̄m
−1/ε
1 − r from (23) and m1 ≡ m0(1 − π1).
Combining the optimal conditions we have
υ′(τ ∗1,f lex) = (1 + r)βυ
′(τ ∗2,f lex), (35)












1 + xβ(1 + r)
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. Equation (35) indicates,
identically to fixed regimes, that the intertemporal profile of transfers depends
only on the rates of discount and interest. Once again, (36) and (37)
also imply a positive relation between consumption and fiscal transfers.
Nevertheless, since c∗1,pcm = c
∗
2,pcm = c̄ under perfect capital mobility, this
effect plays no role in the intertemporal pattern of transfers for flexible
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regimes. Since υ′′(τ) < 0, the Ramsey planner’s problem uniquely determines











1.2.3.3 Endogenous Determination of Fiscal Policy:
Capital Controls Case
As under fixed regimes, the benefit of increasing fiscal transfers derives from
the direct increase in the FA’s utility, while the cost originates from the lower
real balances held by the PA in period 2. However, as long as the FA is not
more patient than the PA, there is an extra benefit to the FA from higher fiscal
transfers, coming from the increase in PA consumption in period 1 that occurs
because of the decrease in the real domestic interest rate ρ1. The real domestic
interest rate, ρ1, falls below r because of the increase in the financial exchange
rate Q1, which occurs as the PA attempts to rearrange her portfolio because of
the expected inflation tax in period 2. This extra incentive for higher transfers
is absent under fixed and flexible regimes because of the consumption smoothing
that occurs under perfect capital mobility.
We solve the Ramsey planner’s problem in which the FA effectively chooses
τ1, τ2, c1, c2 and m1 to maximize (19) subject to ρ0 = c1m
−1/ε
0 − π1 from (26),
ρ1 = (1 + r)(c2/c1) − 1 from (25), π1 = 0, π2 = c2m−1/ε1 − ρ1 from (27) and
m0 = m0−.
17 Combining the optimal conditions with (28) and (29) we obtain
17 This is the result of the condition f0 = f0− under capital controls.
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(2 + r)(1 + r) + (ρ∗1 − r)

























(2 + r)(1 + r) + (ρ∗1 − r)
(2 + r)(1 + ρ∗1)
]
. (40)
Equation (38) shows that the intertemporal pattern of fiscal transfers
depends on the discount rate and the domestic real interest rate ρ∗1. As in
fixed and flexible regimes, the intertemporal profile of transfers depends in
part upon the relative degree of impatience of the FA (i.e. (1 + r)β). In
addition, there is another effect that is represented by the term (1+ρ∗1)/(1+ r).
This new factor captures the fact that the intertemporal ratio of the marginal
utilities of private consumption is not necessarily one due to the potential
discrepancy between domestic and world real interest rates. In consequence,




2,cc, inducing the FA to make bigger transfers in





inducing the FA to make smaller transfers in period 1 relative to period 2.
These particular intertemporal pattern of fiscal transfers occurs because the
FA increases (decreases) fiscal transfers as consumption increases (decreases).
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Hence, this new effect exacerbates the intertemporal pattern of transfers induced
by an impatient FA if ρ∗1 < r, while it moderates this profile if ρ
∗
1 > r. Since


















1.2.4 Comparing Fiscal Performance Under Alternative Monetary
and Capital Flows Policies
In this section we compare fiscal performance under alternative monetary and
capital flows policies. We define fiscal discipline in terms of the present value
of net fiscal transfers (pdvτ), where pdvτ ≡ τ1 + τ2 (1 + r)−1. An exchange rate
regime induces more fiscal discipline if it has a lower value for pdvτ . However,
it is important to recall that since all regimes explode in period 2, we effectively
observe the performance of each regime only under the relatively “tranquil”
conditions of period 1. Because of this, we also examine the intertemporal
profile of fiscal transfers, in particular the fiscal performance in period 1.
Combining (33), (34), (36), (37), (39) and (40) we obtain
υ′(τ ∗1,fixed) = υ
′(τ ∗1,f lex)
[





(2 + r)(1 + r)




υ′(τ ∗2,fixed) = υ
′(τ ∗2,f lex)
[





(2 + r)(1 + ρ∗1)





Considering (41), (42), (33) and (34), it is clear that the ranking of transfers
across regimes depends on the degree of patience of the FA and on the relation
between ρ∗1 and r. We can summarize the main results as follows:
1. Fixed vs. Flexible: As in Tornell and Velasco, fixed regimes induce larger
transfers in each period than flexible arrangements if the FA is impatient in the
sense that β < 1/(1+r). If β > 1/(1+r), fixed regimes induce smaller transfers
in each period than flexible arrangements. If β = 1/(1+ r) both regimes induce
the same fiscal behavior.
2. Fixed vs. Capital Controls: The comparison of the levels and the
intertemporal distortion of transfers across these regimes depends on the relation
between ρ∗1 and r. As we show later, ρ
∗
1 < r in equilibrium.
- If ρ∗1 = r capital controls and fixed regimes behave identically, since the
capital control does not bind, and the commercial exchange rate coincides with
the financial rate.








2,fixed. The capital control binds
and the financial rate Q∗1 is bigger than E1, so that, there is a positive exchange
premium.








2,fixed. The capital control binds
and the financial rate Q∗1 is smaller than E1, so that, there is a negative exchange
premium.
Thus, capital controls exacerbate the distortion of fiscal transfers present
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under fixed arrangements when (i) ρ∗1 < r and the FA is impatient or (ii) when
ρ∗1 > r and the FA is patient. However, capital controls counterbalance the
intertemporal distortion of transfers when (i) ρ∗1 < r if the FA is patient or (ii)
when ρ∗1 > r and the FA is impatient.
3. Flexible vs. Capital Controls: The comparison of the intertemporal
distortion of transfers across these regimes depends on the relation between ρ∗1
and r; however, the ranking between the levels of transfers also depends upon
the degree of impatience of the FA. As we show later ρ∗1 < r in equilibrium.
Capital controls exacerbate the intertemporal profile of fiscal transfers
present under flexible arrangements when (i) ρ∗1 < r and the FA is impatient or
(ii) when ρ∗1 > r and the FA is patient. However, capital controls counterbalance
the intertemporal distortion of transfers when (i) ρ∗1 < r if the FA is patient or
(ii) when ρ∗1 > r and the FA is impatient.
Regarding the level of transfers, we can state that τ ∗1,cc > τ
∗
1,f lex if: i) the FA
is impatient and ρ∗1 6 r, or ii) β = 1/(1 + r) and ρ
∗










τ ∗2,f lex, the optimal pattern of fiscal transfers differs under capital controls if
ρ∗1 6= r because of the effect of the intertemporal consumption distortion on
fiscal transfers.
5. Aside from the particular case when ρ∗1 = r, we cannot make an
unambiguous analytical statement regarding the pdvτ of capital controls relative
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to fixed or flexible regimes. This is not surprising, since the main new feature
generated by capital controls is the intertemporal distortion of consumption
and fiscal transfers created by deviations of the domestic interest rate from the
world one.
6. Nevertheless, we can state that capital controls induce looser fiscal policy
initially than fixed and flexible regimes whenever ρ∗1 < r as long as the FA is not







Although we cannot solve analytically the Ramsey planner’s problem for
the capital controls case, below we present some intuition and some numerical
examples suggesting that ρ∗1 < r in equilibrium under capital controls. In
other words, under reasonable conditions regarding the impatience of the FA,
capital controls induce looser discipline than fixed and flexible regimes during
the periods before the bomb explodes.
1.2.4.1 Interest Rates, Inflation and Transfers in Equilibrium:
Intuition
The previous sections described optimal behavior for a given path of
domestic inflation and interest rates. In this section we provide intuition for
how these prices are determined in equilibrium. We begin by describing how
the PA adjusts real balances under each regime, since this adjustment is the
critical driving force behind equilibrium prices. We then describe the FA’s
choice of transfers in equilibrium.
29
How the PA adjusts real balances
The main difference between perfect capital mobility and capital controls is
the mechanism by which the PA adjusts real balances. This difference is crucial
for understanding equilibrium behavior in our model, since the PA would like to
reduce her real balances carried to period 2 because of the expected inflation tax.
Under perfect capital mobility the PA can rearrange her portfolio composition
by buying or selling foreign bonds; in particular, if she wants to reduce real
balances the PA can exchange money for bonds. Under fixed regimes the PA
just changes money for bonds at the end of period 1. Under flexible regimes
the desire to reduce money holdings carried to period 2 creates pressures on
the exchange rate in period 1. Due to this pressure, and since the CB does
not intervene in the exchange rate market, there is an increase in the exchange
rate and positive inflation in period 1. This in turn reduces the amount of real
balances the PA wishes to carry into period 1. In other words, an anticipated
increase in the exchange rate in period 2 also boosts the exchange rate in period
1.
Something similar happens under capital controls, in the sense that the
exchange rate market reacts in anticipation of future events. However, this
anticipated behavior occurs via the financial exchange rate and not through
the commercial one, which is assumed to be fixed. Because of the capital
controls, any excess demand for bonds tends to increase the value of the
financial exchange rate Q1. The latter change reduces ρ1, inducing an increase in
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consumption in period 1 and worsening the current account deficit. In summary,
the desire to reduce real balances because of the expected inflation tax in period
2 creates an increase in c∗1 and a decrease in c
∗
2. This effect is always present
under capital controls as long as there is an excess demand for bonds in period
1.
FA’s Incentives
If the FA’s discount factor is β = 1/(1+r), the FA prefers not to induce any
fiscal or consumption intertemporal distortion. However, since the FA has the
proclivity to spend more than socially desirable, the expected inflation tax in
period 2 is always positive in equilibrium. Therefore, flexible regimes induce the
same fiscal behavior than fixed regimes. However, capital controls induce higher
transfers in period 1 than in period 2 because of the consumption distortion
that occurs as the PA attempts to get rid of real money balances because of the
expected inflation tax in period 2.
Assuming an impatient FA, two effects can be identified:
- Fiscal party incentive: Since the FA’s discount factor enters into its direct
utility from receiving transfers (see first term in equation (19)), while the
intertemporal relative cost is given by the interest rate, an impatient FA would
be delighted to have a fiscal party. This incentive is present under fixed and
flexible regimes, as well as under capital controls.
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- Consumption party incentive: As described when we analyzed equation
(19), an impatient FA would also like the PA to have a consumption party.
Under perfect capital mobility we showed that consumption is smooth over
time. However, under capital controls, an impatient FA could add fuel to the
consumption party that is already likely to happen. This encourages the FA to
increase the overall pdvτ in order to increase period 2 inflation and increase the
exchange rate premium in period 1, so that there can be a lower ρ1 and a bigger
intertemporal consumption distortion.
Flexible regimes induce more fiscal discipline than fixed regimes because of
the different timing of exchange rates adjustment. Under fixed regimes any
loose fiscal behavior is reflected only in lower real money demand in period 2,
while under flexible regimes money demand also falls in period 1. Thus if the FA
is impatient, the higher up-front costs of inflation under flexible regimes induce
the FA to exercise more fiscal self-control. This is the main result of Tornell
and Velasco.
What happens to the FA’s incentives under capital controls? Capital
controls enable the FA to enjoy the same temporarily low inflation as fixed
regimes, since the commercial exchange rate is assumed to be fixed. However,
given the way the PA adjusts real balances, an impatient FA has a new incentive
for looser fiscal behavior, because the bigger the expected inflation tax in period
2, the bigger the consumption party experienced by the PA in period 1. This
last effect tilts transfers towards period 1; therefore, capital controls induce
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looser discipline than fixed and flexible regimes before the bomb explodes in
period 2.
We can anticipate from the previous discussions that:
- Case 1: When the FA’s discount factor is β = 1/(1 + r), there will be no
fiscal distortions from the FA’s impatience per se. Therefore, fixed and flexible
regimes will induce the same fiscal behavior. However, under capital controls
ρ∗1 < r, the PA will have a consumption party in period 1 and a severe hangover
in period 2. Therefore, fiscal transfers will tend to be bigger in period 1 and
smaller by a greater margin for period 2 than under fixed and flexible regimes.
As a consequence, the pdvτ under capital controls might be smaller or bigger
than under fixed or flexible regimes, depending on the value of r. That is to say,



























2,f lex = c̄.
- Case 2: When the FA is impatient there will be intertemporal fiscal
distortions due to the fiscal party incentive under all regimes, and because of
the consumption party incentive only under capital controls. Fixed regimes will
induce fiscal transfers in each period bigger than under flexible regimes because
given the same incentive towards loose fiscal policies, the inflation cost under
fixed regimes is paid in period 2, while under flexible regimes it is also paid
in period 1. Under capital controls the inflation cost is, like fixed regimes,
postponed into the future. However, there is a new reason why transfers in
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period 1 under capital controls are bigger than under fixed regimes by an even
greater margin that in Case 1. This occurs because the FA adds fuel to the
consumption party by increasing the pdvτ in relation to the one in Case 1. This
increase the consumption distortion, which induce the FA to have an even bigger
party in period 1 than in Case 1 and, consequently, a more striking fiscal bust in






































2,f lex = c̄.
1.2.4.2 Numerical Examples
Although we cannot solve the Ramsey planner’s problem for the capital
controls case analytically, we provide in this subsection some numerical examples
confirming the intuition that capital controls induce less discipline than fixed
and flexible regimes during the periods before the bomb explodes.18 We assume
υ(τ) = 1 − e−kτ is the FA utility function associated with the net transfers.19
We set the following initial conditions, parameters and endowments: y = 50,
b0− = m0− = c̄
ε r−ε, f0− = 0, r = 0.05, ε = 0.3, α = 0.5, k = 5. Tables 1.2
and 1.3 present results from two examples with different assumptions about the
patience of the FA.
18 We rule out any scenario in which the initial asset position creates an initial excess of
demand for money. This would create pressure towards a negative exchange rate premium
(i.e. Q∗1 < E1) which is not observed in reality when capital controls are imposed. This
peculiar scenario tends to occur if there is an initial positive net asset position in the private
sector (i.e. f0− > 0) and/or an initial positive net asset position in the government (i.e.
b0− > 0). These conditions do not generally apply for EM and developing countries, since
most of them have indebted private and public sectors.
19 We use this utility function because it implies υ′(τ) > 0, υ′′(τ) < 0 and τ R 0. When
transfers are positive in equilibrium, we obtain similar results using other preferences.
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Table 1.2 presents results for the case in which β = 1/(1 + r). As in Tornell
and Velasco, τ ∗1,fixed = τ
∗




2,f lex, so that fixed and flexible
regimes induce the same fiscal behavior. Under capital controls, consumption
and transfers are distorted towards period 1 because of the low domestic interest
rate ρ1. However the transfers in each period, and their present discounted
value, are virtually identical to those under fixed and flexible regimes. For the
same reason, the three regimes attain almost identical PA’s welfare. However,
for this particular example, capital controls generate marginally higher PA’s
welfare than fixed and flexible regimes because they imply a lower pdvτ , despite
the intertemporal distortion.
Table 1.3 presents results for an impatient FA which is, arguably, the most
realistic scenario. As in Tornell and Velasco the presence of an impatient FA
induces a looser fiscal policy in both periods for fixed regimes than flexible
arrangements (i.e. τ ∗1,fixed > τ
∗




2,f lex). For this particular
example, the pdvτ under capital controls is lower than for fixed arrangements
and higher than for flexible regimes. However, the fiscal and consumption party
observed in period 1 is bigger under capital controls than under fixed and flexible
arrangements. Moreover, the consumption and fiscal distortions under capital
controls are larger in this case than when the FA has the same discount factor
as the PA. This occurs because an impatient FA benefits directly from front-
loaded transfers (i.e. fiscal party incentive), and because an impatient FA wants
to encourage a larger consumption party in period 1 (i.e. consumption party
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incentive). FA’s impatience thus boosts the fiscal and consumption party while
the stabilization plan lasts, and increases the severity of the hangover when
the bomb explodes. Capital controls have negative welfare effects in relation
to fixed and flexible regimes because the detrimental intertemporal distortion
effect more than compensates for the reduction in the pdvτ .
In summary, we argue that capital controls induce even looser fiscal policies
than fixed and flexible regimes while the stabilization plan lasts. This occurs
because capital controls enable free-spending politicians to enjoy the same
temporarily low inflation as fixed regimes, as well as a temporary consumption
boom which is regarded as desirable by impatient politicians. This temporary
consumption party induce politicians to engage in a fiscal party before the
stabilization plan collapses.
1.3 Empirical Analysis
In this section we empirically test the implication of our theoretical model that
capital controls induce looser fiscal behavior than fixed and flexible regimes
during the initial periods before the bomb explodes or, in other words, in
relatively “tranquil” times. We also test Tornell and Velasco’s core prediction
that fixed regimes induce less discipline than flexible regimes. The rest of
this section is organized as follows. First, we discuss earlier empirical studies
of the link between fiscal discipline and exchange rate regime. Second, we
present the data used in our study. Third, we show some preliminary evidence.
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Fourth, we present the econometric methodology. Fifth, we show our benchmark
empirical results, accounting for diverse sources of potential exchange rate
regime endogeneity. Finally, we do some sensitivity analysis by considering
alternative exchange rate regime classifications.
1.3.1 Previous Empirical Studies
To begin, we discuss existing empirical studies that test whether fixed regimes
induce more fiscal discipline than flexible regimes. Although this comparison
is not the main focus of our paper, it is useful to identify the main limitations
and difficulties of previous work. Table 1.4 summarizes the principal existing
studies. As mentioned in the introduction, the literature is not conclusive as to
whether fixed regimes induce more discipline than flexible arrangements. Tornell
and Velasco (2000) find that fixed regimes tend to induce less discipline than
flexible arrangements; Alberola and Molina (2004) find similar performance; and
Alberola et al. (2005) and Fatás and Rose (2001) find that fixed regimes generate
more sound fiscal policies than flexible arrangements. Vuletin (2004) finds that
fixed regimes induce looser (tighter) fiscal policies than flexible arrangements
in relatively “stable” (“volatile”) international finance contexts. These studies
share four common problems:
- Exchange rate regime classification. Most previous studies use the de jure
IMF exchange rate regime classification, which until recently asked member
states to self-declare their arrangements. Since such an official classification
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often fails to describe actual countries’ practices, de facto classifications should
be used instead. Only Vuletin (2004) and Alberola et al. (2005) consider this
element.
- Lag of dependent variable as regressor. It is difficult to model the under-
lying “primitive” determinants of the level of fiscal variables like expenditures
and deficits. To get around this problem, previous studies include lagged fiscal
indicators as explanatory variables. Therefore, the econometric specification
should be dynamic, not only because of a direct interest in the coefficient of the
lagged fiscal variable itself, but also because the correct dynamic specification
may be critical to recover consistent estimates of the impact of other variables
of interest, such as the exchange rate regime. Only Vuletin (2004) and Alberola
et al. (2003, 2005) consider this factor.
- Country-specific effects. Heterogeneity in fiscal institutions is considered
to be important in understanding diverse fiscal outcomes.20 Although some
of this heterogeneity is manifested in formal organizations that can plausibly
be measured, many institutions involve informal arrangements and behaviors
impossible to quantify. Country-specific effects account for those unobserved
determinants of the fiscal outcome that are peculiar to each country, and that
do not vary over time. Plausible factors captured by such effects include
political preferences, attitudes towards fiscal discipline, degree of discretion
over expenditures, and transparency of procedures in the budget process. Only
20 See for example Alesina and Perotti (1996) and Poterba and von Hagen (1999).
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Vuletin (2004) and Alberola et al. (2005) consider this element in a panel data
context.
-Exchange rate regime endogeneity. All studies recognize the crucial
importance of this factor. Tornell and Velasco (2000) argue that the Sub-
Saharan Africa sample they use provides a sort of “natural experiment”, since
the choice of exchange rate regime in these countries was based on colonial
history and not on political or economic considerations. This statement might
be correct for the CFA countries21, which maintained a fixed exchange rate with
the French franc from 1948 until 1994, as long as their connection to France did
not also allow them to have a better position in credit markets, or if CFA
countries were not different from non-CFA economies in other respects that
could be relevant for fiscal discipline. Further, Tornell and Velasco’s instrument
is only available for a limited number of countries. Fatás and Rose (2001)
remark that endogeneity could be relevant for currency boards, but not so much
for currency unions. However, they stress that their “results are best viewed
as correlations rather than causal statements”. Alberola and Molina (2004)
argue that endogeneity is not an issue since the choice of the sample “is done
taking into account the more or less explicit attempt of using the exchange rate
peg as stabilizing device”. This fact not only does not guarantee the absence
of endogeneity issues but, on the contrary, might suggest the opposite since it
could imply that the choice of the regime is a response to fiscal performance.
21 CFA refers to Communauté Financière d’Afrique.
39
Alberola et al. (2005) remark that the expected influence of the endogeneity
bias is not clear-cut. While chronic deficits might induce the choice of a fixed
regime, fiscal discipline makes fixed regimes more sustainable.
In summary, while the three first elements are seldom considered in previous
empirical studies, a more appropriate treatment of the exchange rate regime
endogeneity is an open subject in the literature. In this paper we tackle each of
the factors described before, including the regime endogeneity.
1.3.2 Data
Our empirical study uses a panel data set which consists of 23 emerging market
countries in the period 1970-2001.22 We focus on this set of countries because
they have at least 15 years of continuous fiscal data and; more importantly,
because they experienced diverse macroeconomic problems related to fiscal,
inflation and debt difficulties and have ”weak” central banks that recurrently
finance governments via seigniorage and inflation tax. For example, the average
inflation rate for the whole sample is 23 percent, almost 20 percent of the
observations involve foreign currency default and 35 percent have either a Stand-
by Arrangement or an Extended Fund Facility IMF program.
The main sources of data for the macroeconomic and fiscal variables are
Kaminsky et al. (2004), and the publications Global Development Finance and
22 The countries in the sample are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius,
Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Tunisia, Turkey, Uruguay and
Venezuela.
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World Development Indicators. The de jure IMF and the de facto Reinhart-
Rogoff exchange rate classifications are from Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
We also use data on natural disasters from the Center of Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain.23
1.3.2.1 Macroeconomic and Fiscal Variables
Taking into account the theoretical model, the most natural variable to
capture net fiscal transfers is the central government primary fiscal surplus as a
percentage of trend GDP. We divide by trend GDP and not GDP itself because,
as Kaminsky et al. (2004) argue, normalizing by GDP understates (overstates)
fiscal behavior when governments pursue procyclical (countercyclical) fiscal
policies. One of the most notable characteristics of fiscal variables is their
strong time inertia. Table 1.5 shows this strong positive serial correlation with
a value close to 0.75 at a one year horizon.
Our control variables include: i) the country’s position in the business cycle,
ii) terms of trade shocks, iii) initial government debt, iv) whether the country has
a debt default or bank crisis, v) whether the country has an IMF program, vi) the
real LIBOR interest rate and vii) average real GDP growth in OECD countries.
As instruments for the exchange rate regime we use the percentage of total long-
term debt contracted in US$, short-term external debt as a percentage of total
external debt, terms of trade volatility and trade openness. Later, we also use
natural disasters to evaluate the response of fiscal policies to exogenous shocks
23 See Appendix 1.5 for a complete description of all variables used in the study and their
source.
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under diverse exchange rate regimes. We justify these controls and instruments
afterwards.
1.3.2.2 Exchange Rate Regime Classification
The selection of an exchange rate regime classification is crucial for any study
that aims to measure the influence of exchange regimes on other variables. As
remarked by Reinhart and Rogoff (2002), the de jure IMF classification can
be misleading, since “the gap between de facto and de jure can be vast”.
Reinhart and Rogoff (2002) develop a classification that is based upon the
actual evolution of the market-determined exchange rate. This classification
has several advantages compared to the de jure IMF classification: First, it
measures actual behavior as opposed to what countries claim to do. Second,
it identifies capital controls, which are crucial to test our hypothesis. In this
regard, a very attractive feature of this classification is that it identifies all
types of capital controls. This occur because it identifies not only official dual
exchange rate regimes in which the government authorizes the existence of a
parallel exchange rate market, but it also detects other restrictions on the
capital account that trigger off endogenously black parallel markets. Lastly,
Reinhart and Rogoff create a separate category called “free falling”, which
includes extreme macroeconomic distress situations associated with inflation
of over 40 percent per year. As suggested by Reinhart and Rogoff, this category
allows the researcher to avoid mixing the effects of floating regimes under modest
inflation situations with those related to severe stressful circumstances.
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In line with our theoretical model, we do not include observations classified
as “free falling”, since we want to measure the influence of regimes in relatively
“tranquil” times and not when the bomb actually explodes. As described in
Table 1.6, around 20 percent of potential sample observations correspond to this
category. Once “free falling” observations are excluded, we distinguish between
unified markets and dual regimes, with the latter group representing almost 40
percent of the effective sample. Among unified markets we differentiate fixed
from flexible regimes, which constitute around 50 percent and 10 percent of
the sample respectively. Note that the division of observations under unified
rates would differ notably if the IMF classification was used, since around 65
percent of the sample self-declare as having flexible regimes. As Table 1.7 shows,
this occurs because most countries that claimed to follow flexible arrangements
during our sample period actually fixed their exchange rates. This phenomenon
is known as “fear of floating” (see Calvo and Reinhart (2000)).
1.3.3 Preliminary Evidence
Before proceeding with more elaborate tests, we provide a descriptive analysis
by examining the mean differences in the government primary balance across
exchange regimes. In Table 1.8 we examine both the raw data and the deviation
of each observation from its country-specific mean. We find that dual regimes
are associated with worse primary balances than fixed and flexible regimes under
both approaches. Fixed regimes have on average higher deficits than flexible
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arrangements; however, this result vanishes when we consider the within country
experience.
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.9 confirm the mean test results using a simple
regression specification without any controls beyond country fixed effects.24
Since fixed effects might exacerbate the downward bias in standard errors due
to the presence of positive error autocorrelation, column (3) allows for country
clustered heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the errors. Given the strong
time persistence of the primary balance described above, it is no surprise that
this inclusion increases the standard errors and severely reduces the statistical
significance of capital controls.
1.3.4 Econometric Methodology and Specification
In this section we outline the elements that an ideal econometric methodology
should take into account, and conclude that the dynamic panel system
GMM approach developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) constitutes the most
appropriate technique. The desired econometric methodology should consider
the following aspects:
- Lag of dependent variable as regressor. As discussed in Section 1.3.1 the
specification should be dynamic, not only because of a direct interest in the
coefficient of the lagged fiscal balance itself, but also because a correct dynamic
specification is necessary to recover consistent estimates of other coefficients of
24In connection to the second chapter of this thesis, the informal economy could be
interpreted as a fixed effect that influence the tax collection.
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interest.
- Country-specific effects. As argued in Section 1.3.1 the specification should
consider country-specific effects.
- Other fiscal determinants. Our primary goal is to test the influence of
exchange regimes on the primary budget balance; however, other potential
determinants should be included, especially if their behavior is suspected to
be correlated with the exchange rate regime. We consider several regressors:
i) The country’s position in the business cycle captures the procyclicality
or countercyclicality of fiscal policies. Existing literature tends to find that
deficits in emerging markets and developing countries behave procyclically, while
developed countries adopt countercyclical fiscal policies.25 Approximately 47
percent, 59 percent and 62 percent of fixed, flexible and dual regime observations
are classified as recessions respectively.26
ii) Initial government debt measures the debt burden and the ability to
borrow. It is expected that the higher the degree of initial indebtness, the more
difficult will be to obtain a new loan to finance the deficit. The mean level of
indebtness is similar across observations under different exchange rate regimes.
iii) Debt defaults, bank crises and IMF programs represent symptoms of
diverse macroeconomic and financial difficulties. If such circumstances are
mainly the result of continuous fiscal misbehavior, their occurrence might trigger
a fiscal reform towards more discipline, following the arguments developed by
25 See for example Kaminsky et al. (2004).
26 We identify recessions as episodes where trend real GDP is above its actual value.
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Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Velasco (1997). Approximately 50 percent of
debt default and bank crisis episodes are concentrated in the excluded category
“free falling”. The remaining episodes are roughly evenly distributed between
fixed and dual regimes.
iv) As in Calvo and Végh (1999), the real LIBOR interest rate and average
real GDP growth in OECD countries are intended to capture the world business
cycle.
v) Terms of trade shocks represent another external shock that could affect
fiscal performance.27
-Endogeneity of the exchange rate regime and other regressors. Aside from
the initial level of debt, all fiscal determinants -including the exchange rate
regime- are subject to endogeneity. For example, a positive relationship between
fiscal primary surplus and the business cycle could reflect countercyclical fiscal
policies; however, such a positive relationship could also occur if promoting
fiscal discipline drives the economy towards a boom. Therefore, the econometric
technique should instrument for all potentially endogenous regressors.
Taking into account all the previous considerations, the dynamic panel
system GMM approach developed by Blundell and Bond (1998) is appropriate,
since it allows us to estimate a model such as the following:




it β+ηi +µit i = 1, ..., N t = 1, ..., T (43)
27 See for example Lane and Tornell (1999).
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where yit is the central government primary balance, α is a scalar, r
′
it of
dimension 1× g refers to exchange rate regimes, x′it of dimension 1× k consists
of control variables that also affect the central government primary balance, β









jointly independent. This GMM estimator addresses the bias and inconsistency
problems that arise under fixed and random effect estimators due to the joint
presence of country-specific effects and a lagged dependent variable.
The intuition for the Blundell and Bond (1998) approach is as follows.
According to equation (43), yit is a function of ηi and, because of this, so is
yit−1. Since yit−1 is also a regressor in equation (43) both within and random
effect transformations are correlated with the transformed errors even if µit is
not serially correlated, yielding a biased and inconsistent estimator of α. An
alternative that eliminates the individual effect without creating the mentioned
problems is the first-difference transformation. Anderson and Hsiao (1981)
suggest using 4yit−2 or yit−2 as an instrument for 4yit−1. As long as µit
is not serially correlated the proposed instruments would not be correlated
with 4µit. However, Ahn and Schmidt (1995) show that while consistent,
the resulting estimates are not necessarily efficient because they do not use
all available moments. The dynamic panel first-difference GMM approach
developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) uses lagged levels dated t−2 and earlier
as instruments for the equations in first-differences by assuming that µit are
serially uncorrelated and that the initial conditions yi1 are predetermined. While
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producing a consistent estimator of α, Blundell and Bond (1998) show that as α
approaches unity or as σ2η increases relative to σ
2
µ, this estimator has poor finite
sample properties in terms of bias and imprecision because the lagged series
of the levels are weak instruments for the first-difference equations.28 Blundell
and Bond (1998) developed an estimator with superior finite sample properties
for dynamic panel models with persistent data, called dynamic panel system




= 0 for each i –which holds if the
means of the yit series, while differing across individuals, are constant through
time for periods 1, 2, ..., T for each individual– they construct an estimator
that makes use of an extra set of moment conditions. The proposed estimator
not only uses the lagged levels as instruments for first-difference equations but
also lagged first-differences as instruments for equations in levels.
In our empirical model rit and xit could also be endogenous. Two possible
econometric strategies are available to control for such endogeneity: i) the use
of external instruments in a standard instrumental variables approach or, ii)
the use of internal instruments in a similar way as suggested by Blundell and




= 0 as additional
moment conditions. Following Blundell and Bond (2000), constant means of
xit series through time for each country would be sufficient for the validity of
the preceding moment conditions. Although stationary means of business cycle
28 Using Monte Carlo simulations Blundell and Bond (1998) show that this bias is
particularly important when the number of available periods is small. For example, with
a T=4 and N=100 and a true value of α=0.9, the distribution of the first-difference GMM
estimator has a mean of 0.23 with a standard deviation of 0.83.
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might be reasonable, constant means of the exchange rate regime series are not.
For this reason we employ the first approach -using external instruments in a
standard instrumental variables approach- to control for exchange rate regime
endogeneity.
To test the validity of the main assumptions used by this methodology, we
report three tests in each regression outcome. First, we report the Hansen’s J
statistic, which is an over-identifying restriction test which examines whether
the moment conditions assumptions are valid. Second, since the method
assumes that µit is serially uncorrelated, we also report the first and second
order serial correlation test for the residuals of the first-difference equations.
While the first order serial correlation test is expected to reject the null of
no correlation, the second serial order correlation test should not reject the
null hypothesis of no correlation. It is worth mentioning that the Hansen’s J
test does not reject and the second order serial correlation test rejects the null
hypothesis for all regressions at 5 percent significance.
1.3.5 Benchmark Results
In this section we examine the estimation results for the conditional effects
of exchange rate regimes on the primary government balance. In the first
subsection we treat all regressors, including exchange rate regimes, as exogenous.
Afterwards, we control for endogeneity by modifying the sample used, including
additional regressors, using a standard instrumental variables approach, and
using natural disaster events to evaluate the response of fiscal policies under
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diverse exchange rate regimes.
1.3.5.1 Conditional Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes
Columns (1) in Table 1.10 shows the most basic dynamic panel data model,
which only includes the autoregressive component. We confirm that the primary
fiscal balance is highly persistent over time and that exchange rate regimes
influence fiscal behavior in the predicted by the theoretical model.
Columns (2) to (6) in Table 1.10 show the results of the dynamic panel
strategy controlling one-at-a-time for domestic and external variables that could
affect the fiscal performance. The business cycle is negatively related to the fiscal
balance, which suggests procyclicality of fiscal policies. The initial debt has a
positive sign; the higher the initial debt, the lower the possibility or willingness
to undergo fiscal deficits. Neither terms of trade shocks nor international interest
rates seem to significatively affect the primary fiscal balance. The positive and
significant coefficient associated with the average real GDP growth in OECD
countries indicates that good times in the developed world economies are related
to better fiscal performance in emerging markets. When all these regressors are
considered altogether, in Table 1.10 column (7), the results are maintained but
the business cycle loses its significance.
Abstracting from endogeneity issues, the results support the main implica-
tion of the model, that capital controls induce looser fiscal performance than
fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates. Our findings also favor
Tornell and Velasco’s prediction that fixed regimes generate less fiscal discipline
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than flexible arrangements. In quantitative terms, dual regimes produce deficits
1.1 percent and 0.5 percent of GDP higher than flexible and fixed arrangements,
respectively, and fixed regimes cause deficits 0.6 percent higher than flexible
arrangements. These are economically significant magnitudes considering that
the average primary fiscal deficit in the sample is 1.25 percent of GDP.
Exchange rate regime changes over time is a source of identifying variation in
our panel study. However, since the fiscal process is continuous and inertial by
nature, some concern might exist to the extent that “excessive” exchange rate
regime variability allow us to identify the precise influence of regimes on fiscal
performance. For this reason, column (8) in Table 1.10 considers observations
for which the exchange rate regime remains constant for at least four years.
The results stand against this consideration, even when the size of the sample
is reduced by almost 9 percent.
1.3.5.2 Exchange Rate Regime Endogeneity
In this section we address endogeneity of the exchange rate regime and
the business cycle. The latter is addressed by using internal instruments
following the system GMM approach, that is to say, considering lagged levels
as instruments for first-difference equations and lagged first-differences as
instruments for equations in levels.29 To properly analyze exchange rate regime
endogeneity, we distinguish three main potential sources:
- Regime classification endogeneity. The Reinhart-Rogoff classification is
29 Similar results are obtained if the first lag of GDP Cycle is used instead.
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outcome based, in that it categorizes regimes based upon the evolution of the
market-determined exchange rate. For this reason, it is likely that countries
experiencing poor fiscal performance would tend to have more flexible regimes
ex post, while countries experiencing sound fiscal policies would increase their
chance of sustaining fixed regimes or capital controls. Therefore, this source
of endogeneity would tend to generate the appearance of higher surpluses for
fixed and dual regimes than for flexible arrangements. Since the empirical
results do not show this pattern, accounting for this source of endogeneity would
strengthen our results.
- Endogeneity due to regime choice under stress. Countries experiencing
persistent fiscal deficits or other financial and debt difficulties could adopt fixed
regimes as a stabilizing device, or impose capital controls to avoid the effects of
a depreciation on domestic prices while maintaining some degree of control over
capital outflows and international reserves. Therefore, this source of endogeneity
would tend to generate the appearance of lower fiscal surpluses under fixed and
dual regimes than under flexible arrangements. Since the empirical findings do
show this profile, we reduce the likelihood of this type of endogeneity by using
only observations that are at least two years distant from “free falling” events
and controlling for other regressors that are symptoms of macroeconomic and
financial distress, such as episodes of debt default, bank crisis and the presence
of IMF programs.30
30 It is worth remembering that around 50 percent of debt defaults and bank crisis events
were already excluded, since they occur during “free falling” episodes.
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Column (1) in Table 1.11 abstracts from observations within two years of
“free falling” episodes, reducing the size of the sample by 20 percent. This
“tranquil” regression supports the results obtained before. Columns (2),(3) and
(4) include the IMF Program, Bank Crisis and Default variables respectively.
Only the last variable is statistically significant, indicating that countries
experiencing debt defaults tend to improve their fiscal performance. Specifically,
default increases the primary balance by 0.7 points of GDP.31 Interestingly, when
this variable is included, the Initial Debt loses its significance, which supports
the idea that “things must be really bad before they start to get better again”
as formalized in Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Velasco (1997).
The three distress variables are included together in columns (5) and (6) in
Table 1.11, where column (6) only considers observations for which the exchange
rate regime remains constant for at least four years. In both cases the previous
results are sustained in both qualitative and quantitative terms.
- Endogeneity due to government type. As in Tornell and Velasco, we assume
in our model that the central bank’s monetary and capital flows policies are
exogenous and are not the result of any optimization problem. However, it
seems reasonable to think that, to the extent that the regime choice affects
fiscal discipline, the fiscal authority will try to influence the central bank to
31 Although endogeneity of the IMF Program, Bank Crisis and Default variables might
be a concern, two things are worth noting. First, such endogeneity would tend to generate
negative coefficients on the three mentioned variables, which is not what we observe. Secondly,
it is relatively unlikely that the current fiscal performance per se generates such episodes; on
the contrary, distress episodes are usually associated with chronic fiscal and macroeconomic
mismanagement. For empirical purposes we also include the first lag of the three distress
indicators, obtaining similar results.
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choose the type of exchange rate regime that suits the policymaker better.
The model presented above suggests that free-spending politicians would be
more likely than fiscal conservatives to persuade the central bank to choose fixed
regimes or impose capital controls. For this reason, this source of endogeneity
tends to generate the appearance of looser fiscal performance in fixed and dual
regimes than in flexible arrangements. We control for this source of endogeneity
by using instrumental variables and by exploiting the randomness of natural
disaster events to evaluate the response of fiscal policies under diverse exchange
rate regimes.
Four variables are used as instruments for the exchange rate regime: i) the
percentage of total long-term debt contracted in US$, ii) short-term external
debt as a percentage of total external debt, iii) terms of trade volatility and,
iv) trade openness. The first two variables are suggested by Avellán (2005) to
identify the impact of dual regimes, while the last two are typically used by
empirical papers that analyze the determinants of exchange rate regimes using
factors affecting optimal currency areas.32 Following Avellán (2005): i) The
percentage of total long-term debt contracted in US$ captures the currency
mismatch in a country’s debt structure and proxies its degree of liability
dollarization. If there is a negative shock that puts pressure on the exchange
rate and the currency mismatch is perceived to be critical, policymakers would
rather implement a partial devaluation through a dual regime than a unified
devaluation. ii) Short-term external debt as a percentage of total external
32 See for example Rizzo (1998), Poirson (2001) and Juhn and Mauro (2002).
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debt controls for the maturity imbalance that might be present in external
debt, pushing a country into a liquidity crisis. If a negative shock occurs, a
policymaker whose interest payments are concentrated in the near future would
prefer a dual regime as opposed to a unified devaluation because the debt service
remains unchanged.
The literature on optimal currency areas suggests that fixed regimes are
preferable for more open countries, because of the trade gains derived from
stable bilateral exchange rates, while flexible arrangements are preferable for
economies subject to volatile real shocks such as terms of trade. Because of
potential contemporaneous feedback from the exchange rate regime to these
instruments, we use one lagged values. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 1.12
show the results employing this standard instrumental variables approach. 33.
Columns (1) and (2) use the “tranquil” sample described above and column (2)
only considers observations where regime remains constant for at least 4 years.
The previous results are confirmed; capital controls induce looser fiscal policies
than fixed and flexible regimes operating under unified rates, and fixed regimes
generate less discipline than flexible arrangements.
We also show additional evidence exploiting the randomness of natural
disasters, in line with Ramcharan (2005).34 Severe natural disasters like
33C tests confirm the validity of the exchange rate regimes instruments at a 25% level
34 Ramcharan analyzes the relationship between exchange rate regimes and economic
adjustment to adverse real shocks. He argues that, since the choice of the exchange rate
regime may influence the type of shock that the country experiences, variables commonly
used to capture real shocks -such as terms of trade volatility- can cause selection bias and
hamper identification. For this reason, he takes advantage of the randomness of natural
disasters to measure whether the influence of natural shocks on investment and economic
growth depends on the exchange rate regime.
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droughts, earthquakes, floods and wind storms have two key features which
make them appealing for our purposes:
- Unpredictability and exogeneity. Natural disasters are typically sudden
events, and they are usually unrelated to human activity.
- Government involvement. Since they cause great damage, destruction,
and human suffering, governments generally respond to natural disasters with
diverse policies intending to alleviate the damage inflicted. In particular, active
fiscal policies are used to rebuild infrastructure, homes and productive systems,
as well as to provide assistance and economic help to the families affected.
For these reasons we can assess the impact of exchange rate regimes on
fiscal discipline by evaluating whether the fiscal response differs across exchange
arrangements in the presence of such natural catastrophes. In order to evaluate
this hypothesis we consider the following specification:









it β + ηi + µit
i = 1, ..., N t = 1, ..., T (44)
where (44) is similar to (43), but also includes a natural disasters dummy
ND and its interaction with the exchange rate regimes.
Using the database from the Center for the Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, a
disaster is recorded in his analysis when some of the following conditions hold: i) 10 or more
reported killed, ii) 100 people reported affected, iii) a call for international assistance and/or
iv) a declaration of a state of emergency. He argue that these “low thresholds ensure that
most disasters are recorded in the database”. A natural disaster is registered in the same year
it occurs.
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We identify natural disasters using data from the Center for the Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters. We classify a particular observation as a natural
disaster when:
i) A drought, earthquake, flood or wind storm affects at least 5 percent of the
country’s total population.35 This relatively high threshold guarantees that the
natural disaster is sufficiently important to affect fiscal behavior. For example,
Argentina had natural disasters in around 75 percent of the years in the period
1970-2001. However, 80 percent of those events affected less than 0.7 percent
of the total population, and on average only 0.15 percent of the country was
affected. Although these events have the unpredictability characteristic, it is
doubtful that government fiscal policy significantly responded to such “minor”
events. Using a 5 percent threshold, only 2 flood events occurred in Argentina,
in 1983 and 1988, affecting around 20 percent and 15 percent of the total
population.36
ii) The event is recorded in the year it occurs if it happens during the first
10 months of the year, while it is counted in the following year if it happens
during the last 2 months of the year. Obviously, the destruction effects happen
at the moment of the catastrophe; however, it is likely that the fiscal response
to such severe events is reflected in the following year if the disaster occurs at
the very end of the year.37
35 Similar results are obtained if the percentage of country’s total population used as
threshold varies moderately.
36 Although the data base also contains some information regarding total damages in
monetary terms, it is quite scarce.
37 Similar results are obtained if the month used as threshold moderately varies.
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Considering this definition, 53 natural disasters are recorded, representing
around 7 percent of the total sample. The average share of population
affected by those events is 15 percent, which shows the severity of the recorded
episodes. Excluding observations with “free falling” events, the shares of
disasters occurring under each type of regime are 46 percent, 16 percent and 38
percent for fixed, flexible and dual regimes respectively. These proportions are
similar to the distribution of regimes in the overall sample.
Columns (3) to (5) in Table 1.12 show the estimation outcomes when using
specification (44). Columns (3) and (4) are analogous to (1) and (2) from
a sample and econometric perspective, aside from the new terms included
related to natural disasters. Column (5) eliminates observations for which the
exchange rate regime corresponding to the disaster differs from the previous
year’s regime. This reduces the likelihood that the natural disaster affects the
choice of exchange rate regime. The interaction terms show that fixed regimes
induce lower discipline than flexible regimes in the face of a natural disaster,
and dual regimes generate an even looser fiscal performance than fixed regimes,
giving support to our previous results. In quantitative terms, capital controls
produce deficits that are 2.6 percent and 1.2 percent of GDP higher than flexible
and fixed arrangements, and fixed regimes cause deficits that are 1.4 percent
higher than flexible arrangements.
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1.3.6 Further Evidence and Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we provide further evidence and sensitivity analysis. First, we
consider the price and reserve insulation properties of capital controls. Second,
we use the de jure IMF exchange rate regime classification.
1.3.6.1 Insulation Properties Under Dual Exchange Rate
Regimes
Our theoretical model and empirical analysis assumes, in line with most
of the literature, that the financial and commercial exchange markets can
be separated at zero cost.38 However, as Guidoti (1988) notices, when the
assumption of complete separation is relaxed, different types of “leakages”
arise. Moreover, Kiguel et al. (1997) remark that the higher the exchange
rate premium the more important are those “leakages” and, consequently, the
less effective are dual regimes in insulating prices and reserves.39 In fact, this is
the main reason why these regimes are usually abandoned, not because they are
no longer needed, but because they are no longer useful in protecting reserves
and maintaining low inflation.
38 Some exceptions are Guidoti (1988), Braga de Macedo (1982), Bhandari and Decaluwé
(1990) and Bhandari and Végh (1990).
39 Different “leakages” arise when exchange rate premiums increase. Following Kiguel et
al. (1997) some of them are: i) Through illegal trade, as exports are diverted from official to
unofficial channels (Fleming 1971, Lanyi 1975 and Bhagwati 1978). ii) Outflows of reserves
may also occur through legal channels, for example Kamin (1993) reports that exporters
in Argentina aggressively used special export financing facilities during the early 1980s. iii)
Imports are overinvoiced (May 1995, O’Connel 1991). iv) For individuals with access to foreign
exchange at the commercial exchange rate, a rise in the exchange rate premium increases the
profit from diverting funds from the official market to the parallel one and, therefore, the
supply of official reserves for private capital flows also increases.
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Our previous results are not likely to be driven by the more severe cases
in which these type of “leakages” may happen, since the sample does not
include “free falling” episodes.40 However, there could still be “leakages” of
a lower magnitude. For this reason we separate dual regimes according to the
evolution of the market-determined exchange rate following the Reinhart-Rogoff
classification. The median exchange premium for dual regimes with flexible
market-determined exchange rates, Dual(Flex.), is 20.2 percent, while for dual
regimes with fixed market-determined exchange rates, Dual(Fixed), the median
is 6.2 percent. This difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0001.
Table 1.13 shows that capital controls induce looser fiscal policy than regimes
operating under unified rates, but that effect is smaller as the market-determined
exchange rate becomes more flexible and the exchange rate premium increases.
This result is consistent with the idea that increments in the exchange rate
premium intensify the “leakages”, weakening the price and reserve insulation
properties of capital controls, and consequently reducing the fiscal incentives
to unsound fiscal policies. In other words, as the “leakages” become more
important, price formation and capital flows tend to be closer to those under
flexible regimes. For this reason, governments with low fiscal discipline face
immediate inflation costs and do not enjoy the same degree of control over the
consumption distortion.
40 The median exchange premium and inflation for “free falling” events which operate under
dual regimes are 28 percent and 47.5 percent respectively, while for not “free falling” dual
regimes they are 12.5 percent and 11.6 percent. These differences are statistically significant
with a p-value of 0.001
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Two issues are worth noting. First, there might be some concern about
our results if Dual(Fixed) regimes are associated with low premiums because
of large official exchange rate devaluations. If this is the case, such regimes
might be associated with poor fiscal performance because they are associated
with the collapse of an unsustainable official exchange rate and not because
of the relatively strong price and reserve insulations that low premiums may
assure. This concern does not seem to be warranted, since only 1.5 percent
of Dual(Fixed) regimes have official exchange devaluations higher than 25
percent, while 20 percent of Dual(Flex.) observations are associated with large
devaluations. Second, endogeneity issues might also arise, since poor fiscal
performance tends to increase the exchange premium. However if this element
drives our results, Dual(Flex.) regimes should have worse fiscal discipline than
Dual(Fixed) arrangements, which is the opposite of what we found. In other
words, these two concerns affect our estimation results, correcting for them
would strength our findings and not weaken them.
1.3.6.2 De jure Exchange Rate Regime Classification
So far we have used the de facto Reinhart-Rogoff classification. In this section
we consider instead the de jure IMF classification for those arrangements
operating under unified rates. The results are presented in Table 1.14.
Considering this classification, fixed regimes generate the same discipline as
flexible arrangements; however, dual regimes still induce less discipline than
either regime operating under unified rates. Therefore, the difference between
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what countries claim to do and what they actually do clearly matters when
analyzing the influence of exchange arrangements on diverse macroeconomic
variables, including the primary fiscal balance.
1.4 Conclusions
In this paper we offer both theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
showing that capital controls induce looser fiscal policies than fixed and flexible
regimes operating under perfect capital mobility.
On the theoretical front we argue that while capital controls allow politicians
to enjoy the same temporarily low inflation as fixed regimes, lax fiscal policies
also generate a temporary consumption boom which is regarded as desirable by
impatient politicians. The consumption boom occurs because as the households
attempt to get rid of unwanted real money balances, the real domestic interest
rate falls. Therefore, the more shortsighted the politicians are, the looser the
fiscal policies will be.
We performed an econometric analysis confirming that capital controls lead
to larger primary deficits than fixed and flexible regimes under unified rates.
Our findings also support Tornell and Velasco’s core prediction that fixed
regimes induce less discipline than flexible regimes. We confirm the relevance of
“leakages” under capital controls. In particular we find that when the market-
determined exchange rate is more flexible and the exchange rate premium
increases, fiscal performance tends to improve.
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The general consensus among economists is that capital controls are clearly
harmful to economic efficiency because they prevent resources from being used
where they are most productive. These controls have been associated with
systems of financial repression, persistent overvaluation of official exchange
rates, protection of inefficient import-substituting industries and low economic
growth.41 However, several arguments claim that capital controls might be a
useful policy. One of the most frequent justifications is that capital controls
provide at least temporary insulation of reserves and domestic prices from
transitory shocks to the capital account. In this line of thought Tobin (1978)
advocated throwing “some sand in the wheels of our excessively efficient
international money markets”. Similarly Dornbusch (1986) claims that “running
the world to the tune of assets markets may be undesirable. Hence the interest
in institutional arrangements that delink asset markets and free policies to be
directed to a government’s true priorities”, and in a similar vein Krugman (1998)
argues that “currency controls are a risky, stopgap measure, but some gaps
desperately need to be stopped”. In line with the first group of papers, we
provide theoretical arguments confirming the distortions that capital controls
induce in terms of consumption and current account deficits. Our findings also
counter the arguments that advocate the use of capital controls as temporary
relief for temporary capital account shocks, because the loose fiscal policy they
induce might exacerbate the initial condition they were intended to alleviate.
41 See for example Fry (1988), McKinnon (1973), Shaw (1973), Eichengreen et al. (1999),
Barro and Lee (1993), Bhagwati (1978) and Avellán (2005).
63
1.5 Appendix
Table 1.1 Sources and Definitions of Variables
Variable Name Definition and Source
Fixed 1 if Reinhart and Rogoff coarse exchange rate regime classification
equals 1 or 2 under unified market, i.e. fixed or limited flexibility
not dual. 0 for any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Flexible 1 if Reinhart and Rogoff coarse exchange rate regime classification
equals 3 or 4 under unified market, i.e. managed or freely floating
not dual. 0 for any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Dual 1 if there exists a dual exchange rate regime, i.e. a market
determined and an official exchange rate. 0 for any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Dual (Fixed) 1 if there exists a dual exchange rate regime and Reinhart and
Rogoff coarse exchange rate regime classification equals 1 or 2 ,
i.e. there are a market-determined and an official exchange rates
and the former one behaves fixed or with limited flexibility. 0 for
any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Dual (Flex.) 1 if there exists a dual regime and Reinhart and Rogoff coarse
exchange rate regime classification equals 3 or 4 , i.e. there are a
market determined and an official exchange rates and the former
one behaves as a flexible exchange rate. 0 for any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Freely Falling 1 if Reinhart and Rogoff’s coarse exchange rate regime classification
equals 5, i.e. if inflation is above 40%. 0 for any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
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Variable Name Definition and Source
Fixed (IMF) 1 if the IMF exchange rate regime classification is “single currency
peg”, “SDR peg”, “other official basket peg”, “secret basket peg”
under unified market, i.e. de jure fixed or limited flexibility not dual.
0 for any other category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Flexible (IMF) 1 if the IMF exchange rate regime classification is “more flexible”
under unified market, i.e. de jure floating not dual. 0 for any other
category.
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2002).
Cgpb Central government primary fiscal balance (as percentage of GDP
trend). GDP trend was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with a smoothing parameter of 100.
Source: Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004).
GDP Cycle Calculated as
(
(RGDP - RGDP Trend)/RGDP Trend
)
*100. RGDP
is real GDP and its trend was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott
filter with a smoothing parameter of 100.
Source: Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004).
Initial Debt Total public and private guarantee debt as percentage of GDP at
the end of last year.
Source: Global Development Finance 2005.
TOT Shock Calculated as
(
(TOT - TOT Trend)/TOT Trend
)
*100. TOT is
terms of trade, calculated as the ratio of the export price index to
the corresponding import price index measured relative to the base
year 1995. Its trend was calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott filter
with a smoothing parameter of 100.
Source: Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004).
Real LIBOR Eurodollar deposits rate (London) minus US consumer price index
inflation rate. The deposit’s maturity is 6 months and it was
annualized using a 360-day year or bank interest.
Sources: The Federal Reserve Board for the Eurodollar deposit
rates and World Development Indicators 2006 for inflation rates.
OECD growth Average annual Real GDP growth for OECD countries.
Source: World Development Indicators 2006.
Default 1 if foreign currency bank or bond debt default. 0 otherwise.
Source: Standard & Poor’s.
Bank Crisis 1 if there is a systematic banking crises. 0 otherwise.
Source: Caprio and Klingebiel (1999 and 2003).
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Variable Name Definition and Source
IMF Program 1 if there is either a Stand-by Arrangement or an Extended Fund
Facility IMF program for at least 7 months in the year under
consideration. 0 otherwise.
Source: Policy Development and Review Department, IMF.
ND 1 if there is a natural disaster that affects at least 5% of the country’s
total population in the first ten month of the current year or in the
last two month of the previous year. The events include droughts,
earthquakes, floods and wind storms. 0 otherwise.
Source: Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters,
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium.
Fordebt Percentage of total long-term debt contracted in US$.
Source: Global Development Finance 2005.
Stdebt Short-term external debt as percentage of total external debt.
Source: Global Development Finance 2005.
Totvol Terms of trade volatility calculated as standard deviation of terms
of trade in the last five years.
Source: Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004).
Openness Imports and Exports as percentage of GDP.
Source: World Development Indicators 2006.
Table 1.2 Example 1. β = 1/1.05 = 1/(1 + r).
Variable CC Fixed Flexible (CC-Fixed) (CC-Flex.) (Fixed-Flex.)
4 % 4 % 4 %
τ1 1.294 1.291 1.291 0.257 0.257 0
τ2 1.287 1.291 1.291 -0.275 -0.275 0
pdvτ 2.520 2.520 2.520 -0.002 -0.002 0
c1 55.291 54.381 54.381 1.674 1.674 0
c2 53.425 54.381 54.381 -1.758 -1.758 0
m0 8.146 8.146 5.406 0 50.677 50.677
m1 4.027 3.940 4.616 2.205 -12.771 -14.653
π1 0 0 0.146
π2 0.500 0.513 0.282 -2.579 77.222 81.914
ρ1 0.015
Q1 1.035
PA’s Welfare 7.782 7.782 7.782 0.007 0.007 0.000
Note: CC denote capital controls.
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Table 1.3 Example 2. β = 1/1.5 < 1/(1 + r).
Variable CC Fixed Flexible (CC-Fixed) (CC-Flex.) (Fixed-Flex.)
4 % 4 % 4 %
τ1 1.384 1.362 1.339 1.595 3.369 1.746
τ2 1.265 1.291 1.267 -1.989 -0.181 1.845
pdvτ 2.588 2.591 2.545 -0.105 1.686 1.793
c1 60.618 54.381 54.381 11.470 11.470 0
c2 47.832 54.381 54.381 -12.043 -12.043 0
m0 8.146 8.146 5.390 0 51.131 51.131
m1 3.524 3.884 4.592 -9.278 -23.258 -15.410
π1 0 0 0.148
π2 0.890 0.540 0.288 64.681 209.040 87.660
ρ1 -0.171
Q1 1.267
PA’s Welfare 7.763 7.781 7.782 -0.232 -0.236 -0.005





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.5 Serial Correlation of Central Government







Table 1.6 Exchange Rate Regime Categories using Reinhart and
Rogoff Classification
Category Observations Share of total sample Share of total sample
excluding “free falling”
Fixed unified rates 298 40.5 51.6
Flexible unified rates 56 7.6 9.7
Dual 224 30.4 38.8
“Free falling” 158 21.5
Total 736 100 100
Table 1.7 Deeds vs. Words: Reinhart and Rogoff vs. IMF Classification.
Reinhart and Rogoff Classification
Fixed Flexible Total
IMF Fixed 119 11 130
Classification Flexible 179 45 224
Total 298 56 354
Note: Neither “free falling” nor dual regime observations are considered.
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Table 1.8 Mean Test for Central Government Primary Fiscal Balance
(as percentage of Trend GDP) across Exchange Rate Regimes.
Cgpb mean value H0 : Means are equal
H1: Means are different (p-value)
Fixed Flexible Dual Fixed vs. Fixed vs. Dual vs.
Flexible Dual Flexible
Overall -0.760 -0.027 -2.294 0.047 0 0
Within 0.592 0.507 -1.004 0.833 0 0.001
Note: Within measures are obtained by subtracting from each observation the country’s mean value.
We allow unequal variances in the the two-sample t-test. There are 489 Obs.
The value 0 is reported when the first four decimal digits equal zero.
Table 1.9 Unconditional Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes.
Dependent Variable:Central Government Primary Fiscal Balance
(as percentage of Trend GDP).
Pooled Country Country




Fixed -0.734 0.367 0.367
(2.041)∗∗ (0.722) (0.297)
Dual -2.267 -2.19 -2.19
(5.611)∗∗∗ (4.266)∗∗∗ (1.496)
Observations 489 489 489
Countries 23 23 23
R2 0.076 0.133 0.133
p-value: Fixed=Flex. 0.042 0.471 0.769
Dual=Flex. 0 0 0.149
Fixed=Dual 0 0 0.01
Notes: Flexible regime is the omitted category. Intercept estimatior not reported. Estimations are
performed with OLS -column 1- and country fixed effects -columns 2 and 3. Standard errors
of columns 1 and 2 are adjusted by heteroscedasticity while those reported in column 3 are
also clustered by country, that is, the observations are assumed to be independent across
countries, but not necessarily within countries.
The value 0 is reported when the first four decimal digits equal zero.





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.11 Conditional Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes Considering
Endogeneity Due to Regime Choice Under Stress.
Dependent Variable: Central Government Primary Fiscal Balance
(as percentage of Trend GDP).
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
“Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil”
“Const.”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cgpb (-1) 0.737 0.738 0.738 0.73 0.729 0.728
(15.530)∗∗∗ (15.577)∗∗∗ (15.612)∗∗∗ (15.537)∗∗∗ (15.743)∗∗∗ (15.449)∗∗∗
Fixed -0.552 -0.551 -0.545 -0.554 -0.567 -0.563
(2.231)∗∗ (2.267)∗∗ (2.204)∗∗ (2.193)∗∗ (2.284)∗∗ (2.037)∗∗
Dual -1.086 -1.083 -1.094 -1.18 -1.221 -1.212
(2.823)∗∗∗ (2.798)∗∗∗ (2.848)∗∗∗ (2.873)∗∗∗ (2.907)∗∗∗ (2.659)∗∗∗
GDP Cycle -0.033 -0.032 -0.031 -0.03 -0.03 -0.026
(1.509) (1.515) (1.456) (1.495) (1.466) (1.302)
Initial Debt 0.011 0.011 0.01 0.005 0.005 0.005
(2.346)∗∗ (2.512)∗∗ (2.163)∗∗ (0.921) (0.992) (0.910)
TOT Shock 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.306) (0.301) (0.309) (0.245) (0.206) (0.217)
Real LIBOR -0.02 -0.02 -0.024 -0.021 -0.023 -0.018
(0.417) (0.418) (0.490) (0.445) (0.461) (0.361)
OECD Growth 0.161 0.162 0.162 0.159 0.156 0.165
(2.185)∗∗ (2.201)∗∗ (2.189)∗∗ (2.150)∗∗ (2.121)∗∗ (2.283)∗∗
IMF Program 0.013 -0.126 -0.149
(0.080) (0.837) (0.962)
Bank Crisis 0.233 0.14 0.16
(0.913) (0.607) (0.663)
Default 0.702 0.737 0.773
(2.441)∗∗ (2.644)∗∗∗ (2.836)∗∗∗
Observations 395 395 395 395 395 381
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 22
p-value: OIR test 1 1 1 1 1 1
m1 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006
m2 0.101 0.101 0.1 0.098 0.1 0.1
p-value: Fixed=Flex. 0.026 0.023 0.028 0.028 0.022 0.042
Dual=Flex. 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.008
Fixed=Dual 0.05 0.053 0.045 0.027 0.027 0.029
Notes: Flexible regimes is the omitted category. Intercept estimatior not reported. All estimations are
performed with country fixed effects using Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM approach.
In all columns the exchange rate regimes are treated as exogenous. GDP Cycle is instrumented
using internal instruments following the system GMM approach. Similar results are obtained if
the first lag of GDP Cycle is used instead. All columns use observations that are at least two
years distant from free falling regimes, which proxy for “tranquil” times. Column 6 only considers
observations for which the exchange rate regime remains “constant” for at least 4 years.
OIR test refers to the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test. m1 and m2 refers to first and
second order serial correlation test, respectively.
Absolute t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.12 Conditional Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes Considering
Endog. Due to Regime Choice Under Stress and Government Type Endog.
Dependent Variable:Central Government Primary Fiscal Balance
(as percentage of Trend GDP).
GMM GMM GMM GMM GMM
“Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil” “Tranquil”
“Const.” “Const.” “Const.”
“Const. ND”
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Cgpb (-1) 0.729 0.727 0.717 0.717 0.714
(15.708)∗∗∗ (15.613)∗∗∗ (15.332)∗∗∗ (15.324)∗∗∗ (15.217)∗∗∗
Fixed -0.565 -0.557 -0.504 -0.481 -0.482
(2.251)∗∗ (1.984)∗∗ (1.567) (1.319) (1.325)
Dual -1.213 -1.206 -1.058 -1.022 -1.031
(2.907)∗∗∗ (2.633)∗∗∗ (2.360)∗∗ (2.065)∗∗ (2.088)∗∗
Fixed*ND -0.964 -1.105 -1.467
(2.030)∗∗ (2.063)∗∗ (3.154)∗∗∗
Dual*ND -2.207 -2.263 -2.626
(3.052)∗∗∗ (3.109)∗∗∗ (4.806)∗∗∗
ND 0.223 0.275 0.636
(0.397) (0.462) (1.855)∗
GDP Cycle -0.03 -0.025 -0.021 -0.019 -0.019
(1.494) (1.247) (1.116) (0.996) (1.030)
Initial Debt 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
(1.000) (0.916) (1.063) (0.937) (0.912)
TOT Shock 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.212) (0.262) (0.218) (0.218) (0.243)
Real LIBOR -0.023 -0.019 -0.028 -0.022 -0.021
(0.462) (0.368) (0.543) (0.429) (0.409)
OECD Growth 0.156 0.165 0.17 0.18 0.181
(2.126)∗∗ (2.285)∗∗ (2.407)∗∗ (2.552)∗∗ (2.577)∗∗∗
IMF Program -0.127 -0.153 -0.179 -0.209 -0.228
(0.848) (0.991) (1.159) (1.378) (1.503)
Bank Crisis 0.139 0.161 0.097 0.113 0.114
(0.605) (0.672) (0.446) (0.508) (0.513)
Default 0.735 0.775 0.857 0.901 0.909
(2.640)∗∗∗ (2.827)∗∗∗ (2.995)∗∗∗ (3.230)∗∗∗ (3.261)∗∗∗
Observations 395 381 395 381 379
Countries 22 22 22 22 22
p-value: OIR test 1 1 1 1 1
m1 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
m2 0.1 0.1 0.091 0.092 0.091
p-value: Fixed=Flex. 0.024 0.047 0.117 0.186 0.185
Dual=Flex. 0.004 0.008 0.039 0.039 0.037
Fixed=Dual 0.028 0.032 0.066 0.076 0.072
Fixed*ND=Flex.*ND 0.042 0.039 0.002
Dual*ND=Flex.*ND 0.002 0.002 0
Fixed*ND=Dual*ND 0.036 0.061 0.061
Notes: Flexible regimes is the omitted category. Intercept estimation not reported. All estimations are
performed with country fixed effects using Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM approach.
Exchange rate regimes are instrumented using the first lag of i) Fordebt, ii) Stdebt, iii) Openness
and iv) Totvol. GDP Cycle is instrumented using internal instruments following the system GMM
approach. Similar results are obtained if the first lag of GDP Cycle is used instead. All columns
use obs. that are at least two years distant from “free falling” regimes. Columns 2, 4 and 5 only
consider obs. for which the exchange rate regime remains “constant” for at least 4 years. Column
5 does not include obs. for which the exchange rate regime corresponding to the year in which the
natural disaster (ND) is registered does not coincide with the one of the previous year.
OIR test refers to the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test. m1 and m2 refer to first and second
order serial correlation test, respectively. The value 0 is reported when the first four decimal digits
equal zero. Absolute t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.13 Conditional Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes Considering
Endogeneity Due to Regime Choice Under Stress.
Dependent Variable: Central Government Primary Fiscal Balance









Dual (Fixed) -1.61 -1.608
(3.129)∗∗∗ (2.943)∗∗∗
Dual (Flex.) -0.683 -0.666
(1.890)∗ (1.666)∗
GDP Cycle -0.018 -0.015
(0.940) (0.784)
Initial Debt 0.006 0.006
(1.110) (0.996)
TOT Shock 0.003 0.004
(0.398) (0.406)
Real LIBOR -0.044 -0.04
(0.964) (0.866)
OECD Growth 0.142 0.151
(1.954)∗ (2.125)∗∗
IMF Program -0.059 -0.075
(0.402) (0.493)






p-value: OIR test 1 1
m1 0.007 0.007
m2 0.091 0.092
p-value: Fixed=Flex. 0.026 0.046
Dual (Fix)=Flex. 0.002 0.003
Dual (Flex)=Flex. 0.059 0.096
Fixed=Dual (Fix) 0.013 0.015
Fixed=Dual (Flex.) 0.639 0.684
Dual (Fix)=Dual (Flex.) 0.024 0.024
Notes: Flexible regimes is the omitted category. Intercept estimatior not reported. All estimations are
performed with country fixed effects using Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM approach.
In all columns the exchange rate regimes are treated as exogenous. GDP Cycle is instrumented
using internal instruments following the system GMM approach. Similar results are obtained if
the first lag of GDP Cycle was used instead. All columns use observations that are at least two
years distant from free falling regimes, which proxy for “tranquil” times. Column 2 only considers
observations for which the exchange rate regime remains “constant” for at least 4 years.
OIR test refers to the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test. m1 and m2 refers to first and
second order serial correlation test, respectively.
Absolute t-statistics in brackets. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels,
respectively.
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Table 1.14 Conditional Effects of Exchange Rate Regimes Considering
Endogeneity Due to Regime Choice Under Stress.
Dependent Variable: Central Government Primary Fiscal Balance





Cgpb (-1) 0.731 0.731
(15.425)∗∗∗ (15.281)∗∗∗




GDP Cycle -0.034 -0.032
(1.517) (1.406)
Initial Debt 0.004 0.004
(0.799) (0.697)
TOT Shock 0.002 0.002
(0.236) (0.236)
Real LIBOR -0.024 -0.018
(0.457) (0.338)
OECD Growth 0.161 0.17
(2.189)∗∗ (2.381)∗∗
IMF Program -0.096 -0.109
(0.631) (0.700)






p-value: OIR test 1 1
m1 0.006 0.006
m2 0.1 0.096
p-value: Fixed (IMF)=Flex. (IMF) 0.864 0.964
Dual =Flex. (IMF) 0.011 0.014
Fixed (IMF)=Dual 0.063 0.064
Notes: Flexible regimes is the omitted category. Intercept estimatior not reported. All estimations are
performed with country fixed effects using Blundell and Bond (1998) system GMM approach.
In all columns the exchange rate regimes are treated as exogenous. GDP Cycle is instrumented
using internal instruments following the system GMM approach. Similar results are obtained if
the first lag of GDP Cycle was used instead. All columns use observations that are at least two
years distant from free falling regimes, which proxy for “tranquil” times. Column 2 only
considers observations for which the exchange rate regime remains “constant” for at least 4 years.
OIR test refers to the Hansen over-identifying restrictions test. m1 and m2 refers to first and
second order serial correlation test, respectively.







What is the Size of the Pie? Measuring the Informal 
Economy in Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
2.1 Introduction  
The measurement of the size of the informal economy has evoked considerable 
interest in both academic environments and policy circles, especially given its 
importance for emerging markets and developing countries. At the same time, 
measuring the informal economy is not an easy task. The biggest challenge arises 
from the lack of a clear definition of the informal economy.  A wide range of 
similar terms are used in the literature such as hidden economy, shadow 
economy, clandestine economy, parallel economy, subterranean economy, 
unreported economy, cash economy and black economy. However, as a result of 
recent comprehensive publications and handbooks, there seems to exist some 
level of consensus regarding some terms. Following Feige (2005): 
 
- The illegal economy consists of the income produced by those economic 
activities pursued in violation of legal statutes defining the scope of legitimate 





- The unreported economy consists of those legal and illegal economic activities 
that evade fiscal rules as codified in the tax laws. 
 
- The informal economy comprises those economic activities that circumvent the 
costs and are excluded from the benefits and rights incorporated in the laws and 
administrative rules covering property relationships, commercial licensing, labor 
contracts, torts, financial credit and social systems. A summary measure of the 
informal economy is the income generated by economic agents who operate 
informally. Similarly, Portes et al. (1989) defines the informal economy as “a 
process of income-generation characterized by one central feature: it is 
unregulated by the institutions of society, in a legal and social environment in 
which similar activities are regulated”. 
 
Measuring the size of the informal economy is important for many reasons. First, 
there seems to be strong evidence that suggests a direct and clear link between 
the size of the informal economy and tax evasion. Table 2.2 shows, by using data 
for the early 90s from Schneider and Enste (2000) and Silvani and Brondolo 
(1993), that there is a clear positive relationship between these two concepts. As 
extreme cases, countries like Bolivia, which had an informal economy share of 
approximately 65 percent, experienced VAT tax evasion of about 45 percent; 
while countries like New Zealand, which had a low share of informal activity, 




Second, the informal economy, as a job provider, has an impact on the viability 
of social security institutions, specifically in terms of the latter’s ability to 
provide protection while receiving enough financial support. For example, in the 
early 90s, while 94 percent of the labor force contributed to the social security 
system in Netherlands, this percentage was only 19 for Honduras1. Third, 
inaccurate perceptions about the actual size of the economy could seriously 
decrease the effectiveness of a wide variety of policies. 
 
This paper estimates the size of the informal economy and the relative 
contribution of each underlying factor in the ECCU and 26 mainly Latin 
American countries in the “early 2000s”, being the first study to address this 
issue for the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) economies and many 
other Central American and Caribbean countries. For this purpose, a structural 
equation model approach that considers the informal economy as a latent variable 
with multiple causes and indicators is used. This approach surpasses typical 
limitations of some commonly used time series methods because, among other 
reasons, it does not require information regarding the absolute value of the 
informal economy for each country at some point in time to pin down the 
evolution of the informal economy over time. On the contrary, this cross section 
approach needs this information for only one country in the sample. This method 
also allows the exclusive use of real variables, as opposed to monetary ones, 
                                                 




which might underestimate and misrepresent the relevance of the informal 
economy in countries subject to high degree of dollarization in circulating 
currency. 
 
We find that a stringent tax system and regulatory environment, higher inflation, 
dominance of the agriculture sector, and weakness in governance are the key 
factors underlying the informal economy. The evidence obtained also confirms 
that a higher degree of informality reduces labor unionization, the number of 
contributors to social security schemes and enrollment rates in intermediate 
education.  
 
The size of the informal economy varies considerably from around 16 percent of 
total GDP for Bahamas to 70 percent for Paraguay. Notwithstanding, the average 
size of the informal economy for the ECCU and Caribbean countries (around 33 
percent of GDP) is lower than for Latin American economies (average of 43 
percent of GDP).  
 
The relative contribution of each underlying factor to the overall size of the 
informal economy is also estimated for each country. For some countries like 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, the key element is tax 
burden. For example, for the period under consideration, Antigua and Barbuda 




respectively. For others like St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia and 
Belize, the importance of the agriculture sector appears to be decisive, with 
around 75 percent of exports concentrated in agriculture and food products. For 
other countries like Paraguay and the Dominican Republic, labor rigidities are 
some of the most important factors, with minimum wages representing 170 
percent and 90 percent of the corresponding GDP per capita. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the different 
methods used by the literature to estimate the size of the informal economy. It 
also carefully explains the “Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes” (MIMIC) 
approach, which is the econometric method used in this study. Section III 
presents the set of countries and variables used in the analysis. The empirical 







2.2 Methods for Measuring the Size of the Informal 
Economy 
 
Many alternative methods have been used to measure the size of the informal 
economy2. Some approaches use direct methods based on surveys, but most 
studies use indirect methods based on (i) the discrepancy between national 
expenditure and income statistics, (ii) the discrepancy between the official and 
actual labor force, (iii) the “electricity approach” of Kauffman and Kaliberda 
(1996), (iv) the monetary “transaction approach” of Feige (1979), (v) the 
“currency demand” approach of Cagan (1958) and others, and (vi) the “Multiple 
Indicators, Multiple Causes” (MIMIC) approach. A brief description of each 
methodology, as well as a detailed explanation of the MIMIC approach, is 
provided below. 
 
2.2.1  Surveys3  
 
These micro approaches use surveys and samples based on voluntary replies, or 
tax auditing and other compliance methods to measure the informal economy. 
While providing great detail about the structure of the informal economy, the 
results are sensitive to the way the questionnaire is formulated and the 
                                                 
2 A thorough review of these approaches is discussed in Schneider and Enste (2000) and the 
OECD handbook “Measuring the Non-Observed Economy” released in 2002. 
3 See for example Isanchen and Strom (1985), Witte (1987), Mogensen et al. (1995), Ivan-




respondents’ willingness to cooperate. Therefore surveys are unlikely to capture 
all informal activities. 
 
2.2.2  Discrepancy Between National Expenditure and Income Statistics4 
 
If those working in the informal economy were be able hide their incomes for tax 
purposes but not their expenditure; the difference between national income and 
national expenditure estimates could be used to approximate the size of the 
informal economy. If all the components of the expenditure side were measured 
without error and were constructed so that they were statistically independent 
from income factors, then this approach would indeed yield a good estimate of 
the size of the informal economy. Unfortunately this gap also reflects other types 
of omissions and errors and several expenditure estimates are based on income 
calculations; thus the reliability of this method is seriously arguable.  
 
2.2.3  Discrepancy Between Official and Actual Labor Force5 
 
If the total labor force participation is assumed to be constant, a decline in 
official labor force participation can be interpreted as an increase in the 
importance of the informal economy. Since movements in the participation rate 
might have many other explanations, such as the position in the business cycle, 
                                                 
4 See for example MacAfee (1980) and Yoo and Hyun (1998). 




difficulty in finding a job and education and retirement decisions, these estimates 
represent weak indicators of the size of the informal economy. 
 
2.2.4  Electricity Approach6 
 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) endorse the idea that electricity consumption is 
the single best physical indicator of overall (official and unofficial) economic 
activity. Using some findings that the electricity-overall GDP elasticity is close 
to one 7, these authors suggest using the difference between growth of electricity 
consumption and growth of official GDP as a proxy for the growth of the 
informal economy. This method is simple and appealing, but has many 
drawbacks, including: (i) not all informal economy activities require a 
considerable amount of electricity (e.g. personal services) or use other energy 
sources (like coal, gas, etc.), hence only part of the informal economy growth is 
captured and; (ii) the electricity-overall GDP elasticity might significantly vary 
across countries and over time.  
 
2.2.5 Transaction Approach8 
 
Using Fischer’s quantity equation, Money ·Velocity = Prices ·Transactions, and 
assuming that there is a constant relationship between the money flows related to 
                                                 
6 See for example Del Boca and Forte (1982), Portes (1996) and Johson et al. (1997). 
7 See Dobozi and Pohl (1995). 




transactions and the total (official and unofficial) value added, i.e. Prices · 
Transactions = k (official GDP + informal economy), it is straightforward to 
obtain the following equation Money · Velocity = k (official GDP + informal 
economy) . The stock of money and official GDP estimates are known and 
money velocity can be estimated. Thus, if the size of the informal economy as a 
ratio of the official economy is assumed to be known for a benchmark year, then 
the informal economy can be calculated for the rest of the sample. Although 
theoretically attractive, this method has several weaknesses; for instance: (i) the 
assumption of k constant  over time seems quite arbitrary and (ii) other factors 
like the development of checks and credit cards could also affect the desired 
amount of cash holdings and thus velocity. 
 
2.2.6  Currency Demand Approach9 
 
Assuming that informal transactions take the  form of cash payments, in order not 
to leave an observable trace for the authorities, an increase in the size of the 
informal economy will, consequently, increase the demand for currency. To 
isolate this resulting “excess” demand for currency, Tanzi (1980) suggests to use 
a time series approach in which currency demand is a function of conventional 
factors, such as the evolution of income, payment practices and interest rates, and 
                                                 
9 See for example Cagan (1958), Gutmann (1977), Tanzi (1980, 1983), Scheneider (1997) 




factors causing people to work in the informal economy, like the direct and 
indirect tax burden, government regulation and the complexity of the tax system. 
The size and evolution of the informal economy can be calculated by following 
two steps. First, the difference between the evolution of currency when 
government regulations and the direct and indirect tax burden are held at their 
lowest value and the development of currency with the current (higher) burden of 
taxation and government regulations is calculated. Secondly, assuming the same 
income velocity for currency used in the informal economy as for legal money in 
the official economy, the size of the informal economy can then be computed and 
compared to the official GDP. However there are several problems associated 
with this method and its assumptions: (i) this procedure may underestimate the 
size of the informal economy, because not all transactions take place using cash 
as means of exchange; (ii) at least in the United States, increases in currency 
demand deposits seem to occur mainly because of a slowdown in demand 
deposits rather than an increase in currency used in informal activities; (iii) it 
seems extremely arbitrary to assume equal velocity of money in both types of 
economies and; (iv) the assumption of no informal economy in a base year is 





2.2.7  Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (MIMIC) Approach10 
 
All methods described above consider only one indicator or manifestation of the 
informal economy -e.g. electricity consumption, money or cash demand. 
However, there exist several manifestations or symptoms showing up 
simultaneously. The MIMIC approach explicitly considers several causes, as well 
as the multiple effects of the informal economy. The methodology makes use of 
the associations between the observable causes and the observable effects of an 
unobserved variable, in this case the informal economy, to estimate the 
unobserved factor itself. The model for one latent variable can be described as 
follows: 
 
ελ += IEy                                                              (1) 
υγ += xIE '                                                              (2) 
 
where IE  is the unobservable scalar latent variable (the size of the informal 
economy), ),...,(' 1 pyyy = is a vector of indicators for IE ,  ),...,(' 1 qxxx = is a 
vector of causes of IE , λ  and γ  are the (px1) and (qx1) vectors of the 
parameters and ε  and υ  are the (px1) and scalar errors. In other words, equation 
(1) links the informal economy with its indicators or symptoms, while equation 
(2) associates the informal economy with its causes. Assuming that these errors 
                                                 




are normally distributed and mutually uncorrelated with 2)var( υσυ =  and 
εε Θ=)cov( , the model can be solved for the reduced form as a function of 
observable variables by combining equations (1) and (2): 
            
µπ += xy                                                               (3) 
where 'γλπ = , ευλµ +=  and ευσλλµ Θ+=
2')cov( .  
 
Because y and x are observable data vectors, equation (3) can be estimated by 
maximum likelihood estimation using the restrictions implied in both the 
coefficient matrix π  and the covariance matrix of the error µ . Since the reduced 
form parameters of equation (3) remain unaltered when λ  is multiplied by a 
scalar and γ  and 2υσ  are divided by the same scalar, the estimation of (1) and (2) 
requires a normalization of the parameters in (1), and a convenient way to 
achieve this is to constrain one element of λ  to some pre-assigned value. 
 
Since the estimation of λ  and γ  is obtained by constraining one element of λ  to 
some arbitrary value, it is useful to standardize the regression coefficients λ̂ and 



































The standardized coefficient measures the expected change in the standard-
deviation units of the dependent variable due to a one standard-deviation change 
of the given explanatory variable when the other variables are held constant. 
Using the estimates of the sγ  vector and setting the error term υ  to its mean 
value of zero, the predicted ordinal values for the informal economy ( IE ) can be 
estimated by using equation (2). Then, by using information regarding the 
specific value of informal activity for some country (if it is a cross country study) 
or for some point in time (if it is a time series study), obtained from some other 
source, the within-sample predictions for IE  can be converted into absolute 
series. 
 
The MIMIC approach is chosen as the most appropriate method to calculate the 
size of the informal economy for this sample of countries because of the 
following reasons: 
- Tax auditing and other similar survey based methods are unavailable for most 
Caribbean countries in the sample.  
- The methods based on statistical and labor force discrepancies present, as 
described before, serious limitations and weaknesses.  
- Aside from above mentioned critiques, the electricity, transaction and currency 




approaches are based on time series regressions, extra information11 for each 
country is required in order to pin down the absolute size of the informal 
economy. Without this extra knowledge, the most one can learn is the growth 
pattern of the informal economy. While for some countries like Argentina, 
Mexico and Chile this extra information is possible to obtain, for the ECCU 
countries and other Caribbean countries there is no such data. On the contrary, 
the proposed cross section MIMIC approach requires extra information regarding 
the absolute size of the informal economy for only one country in the sample. 
 
This paper only focuses on real cause and indicator variables, as opposed to 
monetary ones, which might underestimate and misrepresent the relevance of the 
informal economy in countries subject to a high degree of dollarization in 
circulating currency12. This occurs because although monetary data is easily 
obtained for local currency, data is not available for foreign currency circulating. 
In this sense, the present study follows closely the study conducted by Loayza 
(1997) who estimates the size of the informal economy for 14 Latin American 
countries for the early 90s using real variables13. 
                                                 
11 This extra information could be obtained either by knowing the absolute value of the informal 
economy for a certain year or by assuming a base year without informal economy. 
12 There exist the presumption and some concrete evidence based on Feige et al. (2001, 2002) and 
Feige (2003, 2005) that dollarization in circulating currency is a relevant issue for both low 
inflation and non crisis countries like the ECCU, because of tourism and currency substitution 
issues, and for typically high inflation countries like Argentina and Mexico, due to asset 
substitution issues. 
13 Loayza uses the used tax burden, labor market restrictions and governance measures as cause 
variables and tax evasion and the share of the labor force contributing to social security schemes 






The cross section study considers the ECCU countries and 26 mainly Latin 
American countries for the early 2000s14. The countries included are: Antigua 
and Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Cyprus, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Grenada, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Malta, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 
The Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The cause and 
indicator variables considered, and their expected relationship with the size of the 
informal economy, are presented below15. 
 
2.3.1 Cause Variables 
 
First, the tax burden is proxied by the average of corporate and personal marginal 
income tax rate. The highest rate is used when there is more than one rate. The 
hypothesis is that an increase of the tax burden boosts the incentive to work in 
the informal economy.  
 
                                                 
14 Most of the data is based on 2002 or 2003 information. 





Second, increases in legal restrictions on the labor market are hypothesized to 
increase the size of the informal economy. Labor rigidities are captured by two 
alternative indices16: 
- Labor rigidity index #1 considers minimum wage constraints and is calculated 
as the ratio of the annual minimum wage to GDP per capita.  
- Labor rigidity index #2 equals the average of two normalized components, one 
of which is the minimum wage ratio as described before, and the other of which 
captures mandated benefits, as measured by the social security contribution rates 
as a percentage of wages. Following Loayza (1997) in spirit, this second rigidity 
index is divided by GDP per capita in order to account for differences in labor 
productivity across countries.  
 
                                                 
16 Most empirical studies use the labor rigidity index developed by Forteza and Rama (2001). 
This index is constructed by averaging the normalized values of four labor-related variables, 
including minimum wage restrictions, mandated benefits, labor unions (measured by the 
membership of the labor movement as percentage of the labor force) and government 
employment (measured as the employment in the government as percentage of the labor force). 
These last two factors are not included in the labor rigidity indices developed in this study for the 
following reasons:  
Labor unionization  seems to be, at least for emerging and developing countries, a consequence of 
the informal economy more than its cause since bigger informal sectors seem to weak the bargain 
power of the workers in the formal sector. For example, countries with well known important 
informal sectors, like Peru and Ecuador, have very low degree of unionization, approximately 5 
to 10 percent of the labor force; while countries with traditional lower informality like Argentina 
and Mexico have percentages close to 35 percent. For this reason, labor unionization is included 
as an indicator variable and it is expected to be negatively related with the size of the informal 
economy.  
Higher government employment, far from increasing labor rigidity and consequently incrementing 
the size of the informal economy , could reduce the informality, since most public employees 
contribute to social security systems and are regulated by most institutions of the society. This 
variable is not included separately as another cause variable because it might be also subject to 
the Wagner’s law and consequently subject to some endogeneity problem if the degree of 




Third, the importance of agriculture in the economy is included, since many 
studies endorse the idea that informal working is highly segmented by sector, 
with clear prevalence in the agricultural and related sectors. One of the most 
important reasons for this is the minimum enforcement capacity prevalent in 
rural areas. The importance of agriculture is measured as agriculture and food 
exports as a percentage of total exports to reduce problems of endogeneity17. The 
more prominent the agriculture sector, the bigger the expected size of the 
informal economy. 
 
Fourth, following Giles (1999) the inflation rate is included to allow for the 
upward “creep” of tax brackets, and the associated incentive for tax-payers to 
engage in informal activities. A more pervasive effect of inflation is that, as it 
tends to be uneven across sectors, it alters the income distribution, and this may 
induce disrespect for tax law. The higher the inflation, the larger the expected 
size of the informal economy. 
 
Last, the strength of enforcement system is proxied by an average of three 
indicators developed by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), specifically 
quality of bureaucracy, corruption in government and rule of law. The stronger 
the enforcement capability of government, the lower is the expected size of the 
informal economy. 
                                                 





2.3.2  Indicator Variables 
 
First, following Loayza (1997) the percentage of the labor force contributing to 
the social security system is included. The bigger the informal economy, the 
lower the expected number of contributors to the social security system. 
 
Second, the degree of unionization, measured as the percentage of labor force 
with membership in some labor union, is considered. The bigger the informal 
economy, the weaker the bargain power of the workers in the formal sector and, 
therefore, the lower the degree of unionization. 
 
Last, the gross enrollment ratio for secondary school is included as an informal 
economy indicator. Most countries in the world have signed the International 
Labor Organization Convention 138, which made fourteen the minimum working 
age; however one of the most well-recognized consequences of the informal 
economy is child labor and the effect it has on rates of education enrollment18.  
Thus, the bigger the informal economy, the lower is the expected enrollment rate. 
 
                                                 
18 The primary net enrolment rate would be maybe the best proxy to capture this phenomenon, 
however because of data unavailability for most ECCU countries and since for the countries with 
such information there is a high correlation with the secondary gross enrolment rate, the last 




2.4 Empirical Results 
 
2.4.1  Preliminary Evidence 
 
Table 2.3 shows the correlation between each cause and indicator variable. If 
both the conjectured relation between the cause variables and the informal 
economy and the hypothesized association between the informal economy and its 
indicators are present, there should be a specific pattern in the correlations 
between the cause and indicator variables. For example, if stronger labor 
rigidities are expected to increase the size of the informal economy and the latter 
effect is supposed to decrease the percentage of contributors to social security, 
then there should exist a negative relationship between labor rigidity and 
percentage of contributors to social security. It is clear from Table 2.3 that, aside 
for the relationship between tax burden and degree of unionizations (top-right 
cell), all the rest of the observed correlations matches their expected signs. 
Therefore, there seems to be strong preliminary support for our hypothesis. 
 
2.4.2  MIMIC Estimation Results 
The benchmark MIMIC specification, Model 1, is represented in Figure 2.1. The 
labor rigidity index #1, the tax burden, importance of agriculture and inflation are 




the social security system, the degree of unionization and the gross enrollment 
ratio for secondary school are the indicator variables19. Before analyzing the 
estimation results it is important to remark that several goodness-of- fit statistics 
support the underlying model (see grey box in Figure 2.1). These set of 
goodness-of- fit measures are based on fitting the model to sample moments, 
which means to compare the observed covariance matrix to the one estimated on 
the assumption that the model being tested is true. The Discrepancy function 
(CMIN) is one of the most common fit tests and it is the minimum value of the 
discrepancy function between the sample covariance matrix and the estimated 
covariance matrix.  The chi-square value should not be significant if there is a 
good model fit, while a significant chi-square indicates lack of satisfactory model 
fit. The goodness-of- fit index (GFI) and the adjusted goodness to fit index 
(AGFI) tests are also measures of discrepancy between the predicted and 
observed covariances. The GFI can be interpreted as the percent of observed 
covariances explained by the covariances implied by the model. The AGFI is a 
variant of the GFI which adjusts GFI for degrees of freedom. By convention, 
both GFI and AGFI should by equal to or greater than 0.90 to accept the model. 
The root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) is also a fit test that 
some authors argue is less sensitive to sample size than the above mentioned tests 
                                                 
19 Although most variables are subject to certain extent to some endogeneity problem, strength of 
enforcement system might be the one which could be more severely affected. For this reason it is 




(see for example Fan et al. (1999)). By convention, there is good model fit if the 
RMSEA less than or equal to 0.05. 
 
The coefficients on the causal and indicator variables have the expected signs 
and are statistically significant mostly at 1 or 5 percent. Specifically, one 
standard deviation increases in the tax burden, labor rigidities, importance of 
agriculture and inflation increase the size of the informal economy by 0.274, 
0.519, 0.404 and 0.465 standard deviations, respectively. Even more, the joint 
influence of these four cause variables explains approximately 79 percent of the 
variance of the informal economy.  
 
We find that increases in the informal economy reduce the number of workers 
contributing to the social security system, the degree of unionization and the 
secondary enrollment ratio, and explains 76, 35 and 57 percent of their respective 
variances. 
 
Alternative MIMIC specifications are considered for robustness purposes. 
Models 2 and 3, respectively displayed in Figures 2.2 and 2.3, include an 
alternative measure of labor rigidity and strength of enforcement system. They 




presents evidence suggesting that the strength of enforcement appears to be an 
important determinant of the size of informal economy. 
 
2.4.3 Estimations of the Size of the Informal Economy 
 
Using the estimates of the benchmark model, Table 2.4 and Figure 2.4 show the 
standardized ordinal values of the size of the informal economy for the countries 
in the sample. Since these ordinal values only identify the relative position of the 
countries, we set the informal economy of Jamaica equal to 35 percent of total 
GDP in order to estimate the absolute values of the informal economy as 
percentage of total GDP 20. Bahamas, Cyprus, Grenada, St. Kitts and Nevis, 
Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados are among the countries with the smallest 
informal economies, with values ranging from 16 to 25 percent of GDP. These 
values are among the lowest not only for the Caribbean region, but also in 
relation with most Latin American countries. On the other hand, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Belize and Dominican Republic are among the countries with the 
largest informal economies in the Caribbean, with sizes varying between 41 and 
51 percent. Notwithstanding, these estimates are smaller than those for the  
countries with the highest levels of informal activity in Latin America like 
Paraguay and Nicaragua, with values around 70 percent. The rest of the 
                                                 
20 According to a study conducted by De La Roca et al. (2002), the informal economy in Jamaica 




Caribbean countries have sizes of the informal economy similar to the most 
developed countries in Latin America like Argentina, Chile, Mexico and 
Uruguay. 
 
As detailed before, the absolute values of the informal economy, unlike the 
ordinal measures, rely on extra information pinning down the absolute value of 
the informal economy for one country, in this case Jamaica. The information for 
Jamaica is based on a comprehensive study by De La Roca et al. (2002) that used 
different methodologies and data collected as part of the 2001 Jamaica Surve y of 
Living Conditions, and is therefore a very attractive data source to pin down the 
absolute series of the informal economy21. Since the order of countries according 
to the size of the informal economy is independent of this extra information, 
while the absolute values of the informal economy do depend on this data, a 
word of caution should be taken regarding the use of the latter values as accurate 
measures of the degree of informality.  
 
Table 2.5 shows the absolute values of the informal economy for the ECCU and 
other Caribbean countries by using the different specifications employed in 
                                                 
21 De La Roca et al. (2002) studies the informal economy for Jamaica in the early 2000s to 
evaluate the impact of the 1990’s structural reforms. They found similar informal economy 
estimates using macroeconomic approaches like monetary and electricity consumption approach 
and microeconomic approaches based on the addition of the total amount of wages of the 
informal workers, the unreported income of the formal workers in the economy and the value 




Model 1, 2 and 3. It can be inferred that the estimated absolute sizes of the 
informal economy are similar across models. The Spearman's rank correlation 
coefficient  is 0.89 between Model 1 and 2, 0.98 between Model 1 and 3 and 0.85 
between Model 2 and 3. The null hypothesis that the estimated absolute sizes of 
the informal economy are independent across models is rejected at the 1 percent 
level of significance for all comparisons. 
 
The estimates reported here are similar to those for “late 90s” reported in 
Schneider (2002). For 15 common countries, there is a positive correlation of 
0.37 between the absolute sizes of the informal economy, and the spearman’s 
rank correlation test has a rho value of 0.44, which rejects at the 10 percent level 
of significance the null that these rankings have zero correlation. 
 
2.4.4  Relative Contribution of Each Cause Variable to the Size of the 
Informal Economy 
Table 2.6 shows the relative contribution of each cause variable to the size of the 
informal economy for all countries studied, and Figure 2.5 displays these values 
for the Caribbean economies. On average tax burden, labor rigidity, importance 
of agriculture and inflation constitute around 35, 26, 31 and 8 percent of the 
overall size of the informal economy respectively. However, this profile differs 




- For countries like Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago the 
main component influencing the informal economy is the tax burden. For 
example, for the period under consideration, Antigua and Barbuda has maximum 
marginal corporate and personal tax rates of 55 and 35 percent respectively. 
- For others like St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. Lucia and  Belize the 
importance of the agriculture sector seems to be one of the most relevant factors, 
with approximately 75 percent of exports concentrated in agriculture and food 
products. 
- For countries like Paraguay and Dominican Republic the significance of labor 
rigidities appears to be decisive, with minimum wages representing 170 percent 
and 90 percent of the corresponding GDP per capita. 
- For most of the economies, inflation does not seem to be an important factor 
determining the size of the informal economy, because of the price stability 
observed in the second part of the 90s. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This paper estimates the size of the informal economy and the relative 
contribution of each underlying factor in the ECCU countries and 26 mainly 
Latin American countries in the early 2000s, being the first study to address this 






Using a structural equation model approach that considers the informal economy 
as a latent variable with several causes and effects, we find that a stringent tax 
system and regulatory environment, higher inflation and  dominance of the  
agriculture sector are the key factors in determining the informal economy, 
representing altogether around 79 percent of the informal economy variance. The 
results also confirm that a higher degree of informality reduces labor 
unionization, the number of contributors to social security schemes and 
enrollment rates in education. 
 
The size of the informal economy differs considerably among countries. While in 
countries like Paraguay and Nicaragua the informal sector reaches values around 
70 percent of total GDP, in economies like Bahamas, Cyprus, Grenada, St. Kitts 
and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados the informal share has values 
below 25 percent. The average size of the informal economy for the ECCU and 
Caribbean countries is around 33 percent of GDP, while for Latin America the 
average share is 43 percent. Not only do many Caribbean economies have 
smaller levels of informality than the Latin American countries with the smallest 
informal economies, but also the Caribbean economies with the most informality 
have smaller informal economies than the Latin American countries with the 




We also find that the relative contribution of each cause variable to the informal 
economy varies significantly across countries. For countries like Antigua and 
Barbuda and Trinidad and Tobago the most important factor influencing the 
informal economy is the tax burden. For others like St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, St. Lucia and Belize the relevance of the agriculture sector appears 
to be one of the most important elements, while for economies like Paraguay and 
Dominican Republic the significance of labor rigidities seems to be crucial.  
 
The above analysis has important policy implications for authorities striving to 
reduce the degree of informality. For instance, in countries where the informal 
economy is related to a high tax burden, policy options include lowering and 
homogenizing effective tax rates across all sectors in the economy. In economies 
where labor market rigidities generate the informal economy, steps need to be 
taken to increase labor market flexibility. In countries where inflation is the key 
factor, priority should be given to tightening monetary policy and stabilizing 
prices, while in economies with important an agricultural sector, measures to 












Table 2.1 Sources and Definitions of Variables 
Variable Name Definition and Source 
Tax burden The proxy for tax pressure is the average of corporate and personal marginal 
income tax rate. The highest rate is used when there is more than one rate. 
This proxy measure is normalized between 0 and 100. The data correspond 
mostly for 2003 and is obtained from World Development Indicators 2006 
and Bain and dos Santos (2004). 
Importance of 
agriculture 
It is measured by the agricultural raw material and food exports (as percentage 
of total exports) using World Development Indicators 2006 and correspond 
mainly for 2000. For Dominican Republic the year 2001 and for Fiji the year 
2002 information is used. 
Inflation Annual average consumer prices inflation for the period 1995-1999. Aside for 
Antigua and Barbuda in which IMF data is used, the rest of the information is 




Following Loayza (1997) the strength of enforcement system is proxied by an 
average of three subjective indicators reported in the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) for 2002. The three variables considered are quality of 
bureaucracy, corruption in government and rule of law. Quality of 
bureaucracy scores high under “autonomy from political pressure” and 
“strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruption in government services”. Low scores in corruption in government 
indicate “high government officials are likely to demand special payments” 
and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout lower levels of 
government”. The variable rule of law “reflects the degree to which the 
citizens of a country are willing to accept the established institutions to make 
and implement laws and adjudicate disputes”. Higher values are associated 
with “sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an 
orderly succession of power”. ICRG is a publication of Political Risk Services 




Active contributors to old-age pension schemes, in percent of the labor force. 
It is based on social security agencies, household surveys and IMF country 
desks information predominantly for 2002. 
Degree of 
unionization 
Total union membership considering both public and the private sectors, in 
percent of the labor force. The data is mainly from “Country Reports on 








Is represented by the ratio of minimum wage and GDP per capita normalized 
between 0 and 100. The minimum wage corresponds to the most general 
minimum wage regime. When minimum wages vary across sectors, the one 
for manufacturing (or for commerce, if manufacturing is not available) is 
reported. When minimum wages vary across regions, the value reported is 
either a simple average across regions or the minimum wage applicable in the 
main urban centers. A zero indicates that the country has no government set 
minimum wage, although minimum wages negotiated at the sectoral level 
may exist.  
The data for minimum wages correspond to 2002 and it is mainly obtained 
from the “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” (2002). The Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices are submitted annually by the U.S. 
Department of State to the U.S. Congress. The reports cover internationally 
recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For Costa Rica and Mexico 
information from the respective ministries of labor is used.  
Labor rigidity 
index #2 
Is the normalized average of two components divided by real GDP per capita. 
The first component captures minimum wages restrictions and corresponds to 
labor rigidity index #1, while the second element represents mandated benefits 
and it is measured by the contribution rates (as percentage of salaries) for all 
social security programs for both the employee and the employer. Only for 
Belize, where the contributions are flat-rate according to earning classes, the 
normalized legal number of days of maternity leave with full pay without 
complications is used. Following Loayza (1997) the normalized average of 
these components is divided by real GDP per capita in order to account for 
differences in labor productivity across countries.  
The data for minimum wages correspond to 2002 and it is mainly obtained 
from the “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices” (2002). The Country 
Reports on Human Rights Practices are submitted annually by the U.S. 
Department of State to the U.S. Congress. The reports cover internationally 
recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights, as set forth in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. For Costa Rica and Mexico 
information from the respective ministries of labor is used. The social security 
contribution data correspond mostly to year 2003 and it is obtained from 
“Social Security Programs Throughout the World”. Maternity leave 
information correspond to the average of the period 1999-2002 and it is 
obtained from several online publications from The Clearinghouse on 






Total secondary enrolment as a percentage of the corresponding official 
school-age population, mostly for 2001. The sources of information are 
Human Development Report 2005 and “Organization of the Eastern 






Table 2.2 Size of the Informal Economy and VAT Tax Evasion 
 Informal economy  
(early 90s) 
VAT tax evasion 
(early 90s) 
New Zealand 12% 5% 
Sweden 16% 6% 
Argentina 21% 30% 
Honduras 47% 35% 
Bolivia 66% 44% 
             Source: Schneider and Enste (2000) and Silvani and Brondolo (1993). 
 
 
      Table 2.3 Correlations Between Cause and Indicator Variables 
 Workers 
contributing to social 
security 
Gross enrolment ratio 
for secondary school 
Degree of 
unionization 
Tax burden -0.14 -0.12 0.07 
Labor rigidity index #1  -0.59 -0.60 -0.39 
Labor rigidity index #2  -0.59 -0.53 -0.36 
Importance of agriculture -0.39 -0.32 -0.31 
Inflation -0.40 -0.29 -0.30 
Strength of enforcement system 0.82 0.58 0.49 



















       Table 2.4 Size of the Informal Economy:  






(% of GDP) 
The Bahamas -1.766 15.9 
Cyprus -1.496 19.3 
Grenada -1.244 22.5 
St. Kitts and Nevis  -1.108 24.2 
Trinidad and Tobago -1.092 24.4 
Barbados -1.087 24.5 
Mexico -0.797 28.2 
Brazil -0.779 28.4 
Malta -0.752 28.7 
Antigua and Barbuda -0.562 31.2 
Chile  -0.486 32.1 
Argentina -0.428 32.9 
Dominica -0.322 34.2 
Jamaica -0.259 35.0 
Uruguay -0.161 36.2 
El Salvador -0.150 36.4 
Guyana -0.122 36.7 
Peru -0.017 38.1 
St. Lucia 0.251 41.5 
Costa Rica 0.274 41.8 
Guatemala 0.318 42.3 
Venezuela 0.369 43.0 
Colombia  0.410 43.5 
Panama  0.480 44.4 
Dominican Republic 0.515 44.8 
Belize 0.673 46.8 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.974 50.6 
Ecuador 0.980 50.7 
Honduras 1.247 54.1 
Fiji  1.719 60.1 
Nicaragua 2.061 64.4 
Paraguay 2.357 68.2 
Mean 0.000 38.3 
Standard deviation 1.000 12.7 







Table 2.5 Absolute Size of the Informal Economy  
                          Under Different MIMIC Specifications 
Country MIMIC Model 1 MIMIC Model 2 MIMIC Model 3 
The Bahamas 15.9 11.5 15.1 
Grenada 22.5 31.8 22.9 
St. Kitts and Nevis  24.2 24.6 24.4 
Trinidad and Tobago 24.4 25.2 24.8 
Barbados 24.5 36.6 24.3 
Antigua and Barbuda 31.2 29.7 31.7 
Dominica 34.2 38.8 35.0 
Jamaica 35.0 35.0 35.0 
Guyana 36.7 57.3 37.3 
St. Lucia 41.5 52.0 41.8 
Dominican Republic 44.8 46.1 45.3 
Belize 46.8 56.5 47.4 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 50.6 58.4 51.4 




Table 2.6 Relative Contribution of Each Causal Variable  









The Bahamas 0.0 54.6 42.3 3.1 
Cyprus 32.2 0.0 63.5 4.3 
Grenada 57.1 0.0 40.9 2.0 
St. Kitts and Nevis  34.0 32.4 28.1 5.5 
Trinidad and Tobago 61.4 26.5 6.5 5.6 
Barbados 65.6 0.0 31.2 3.2 
Mexico 52.4 14.4 5.4 27.8 
Brazil 31.1 19.6 27.5 21.8 
Malta 52.2 42.1 2.6 3.1 
Antigua and Barbuda 60.5 31.3 6.1 2.1 
Chile  36.1 27.6 30.2 6.0 
Argentina 45.6 15.3 38.3 0.7 
Dominica 43.2 24.7 30.7 1.4 
Jamaica 36.2 33.3 17.6 12.9 
Uruguay 22.8 15.4 43.0 18.9 
El Salvador 32.1 30.3 32.8 4.8 
Guyana 46.3 0.0 47.6 6.1 
Peru 31.9 36.7 24.4 7.0 
St. Lucia 32.9 16.4 48.7 2.0 
Costa Rica 30.8 35.6 22.0 11.6 
Guatemala 31.4 23.0 39.5 6.1 
Venezuela 33.9 24.9 1.1 40.1 
Colombia  36.4 35.3 15.2 13.1 
Panama  29.0 23.1 47.1 0.8 
Dominican Republic 23.9 44.4 26.3 5.4 
Belize 22.9 26.7 49.3 1.1 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 33.8 23.9 41.0 1.2 
Ecuador 21.1 35.7 22.2 21.0 
Honduras 19.8 31.2 37.4 11.7 
Fiji  22.8 29.6 45.8 1.7 
Nicaragua 18.5 37.1 38.9 5.6 
Paraguay 10.4 52.4 32.7 4.5 
Mean 34.6 26.4 30.8 8.2 






























Note: The standardized regression coefficients and their respective t -values, indicated in parenthesis, are 
displayed by the arrow pointing in the direction of influence. 
          In order to remove the structural indeterminacy of the coefficients, the non-standardized coefficient 
associated with Degree of unionization  was set to -1. For this reason a t -test cannot be performed on this 
coefficient. The same standardized coefficients are obtained by setting the coefficient of another 
indicator equal to -1. 









































Share of variance 









share of variance 
explained by its causes 
78.6 % 
 
Overall model fit: 
 
Discrepancy function (CMIN) (p-value) : 0.932  
Goodness of fit index (GFI) : 0.973  
Adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) : 0.907 

































Note: The standardized regression coefficients and their respective t -values, indicated in parenthesis, are 
displayed by the arrow pointing in the direction of influence. 
          In order to remove the structural indeterminacy of the coefficients, the non-standardized coefficient 
associated with Degree of unionization  was set to -1. For this reason a t -test cannot be performed on this 
coefficient. The same standardized coefficients are obtained by setting the coefficient of another 
indicator equal to -1. 















































Share of variance 









share of variance 
explained by its causes 
67.5 % 
 
Overall model fit: 
 
Discrepancy function (CMIN) (p-value) : 0.951 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) : 0.977  
Adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) : 0.918 






































Note: The standardized regression coefficients and their respective t -values, indicated in parenthesis, are 
displayed by the arrow pointing in the direction of influence. 
          In order to remove the structural indeterminacy of the coefficients, the non-standardized coefficient 
associated with Degree of unionization  was set to -1. For this reason a t -test cannot be performed on this 
coefficient. The same standardized coefficients are obtained by setting the coefficient of another 
indicator equal to -1. 








































Share of variance 









share of variance 
explained by its causes 
87.6 % 
 
Overall model fit: 
 
Discrepancy function (CMIN) (p-value) : 0.914 
Goodness of fit index (GFI) : 0.965  
Adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) : 0.885 
































































































































































































































































































































Tax burden Labor rigidity #1 Importance of agriculture Inflation
 
                  Note: Because of graphical reasons only variables with contributions higher than 7% display the associated 
number. 
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